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VISA AS PROPERTY, VISA AS COLLATERAL 
Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown* 
Abstract 
Although the “tragic choice” framework has not been applied in the context 
of U.S. immigration law, current immigration policy is rife with tragic 
choices, defined as a commitment by policy elites to maintaining certain 
illusions which shield from public view tough policy choices that offend 
deeply held values. Take, for example, the issue of commodification of visas. 
Policy makers remain committed to maintaining the historical illusion that 
U.S. visas are open to well-deserving migrants, and are not being “sold.” 
Yet U.S. immigration practice has long made concessions to 
commodification at the margins.  Indeed, some migrants “pay” very high 
prices to obtain the right to enter the U.S. For example, certain elite visa 
applicants must invest significant sums in the U.S. economy as a condition of 
both obtaining and maintaining their visas. While in other countries, the 
poor migrant, like the rich migrant, may pledge something of value as a 
condition of receiving her visa, in the U.S., the poor migrant has no such 
option. Rather, the poor migrant faces another kind of “tragic choice.” She 
may pay a coyote an astronomical fee to transport her across the border 
illegally, or she simply cannot come. 
Why this tragic choice? A primary challenge of immigration law is that it is 
notoriously difficult to screen poor visa applicants. In a quintessential 
problem of informational asymmetry, the typical applicant knows much more 
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about her likely behavior in the U.S. than the government; the government 
typically has no way of evaluating the sincerity of her promise to be law-
abiding. Reflecting the long-time recognition in the common law that a 
contracting party is more likely to abide by her commitment if she pledges 
something of value, this Article recommends that the applicant should have 
to post a bond as a condition of receiving her visa. In the event that the 
applicant later fails to keep her promises, including an assurance not to 
overstay her visa, she would forfeit this bond. 
However, there are problems with bonding regimes in the U.S. context. 
Bonding regimes appear to offend deeply held public values. For example, 
bonding systems may reinforce perceptions that market-based mechanisms 
are being utilized to determine who receives visas, thus potentially excluding 
the poor.  Yet, ironically, bonding systems may actually improve the 
opportunity sets of the poor. For example, a bonding system should raise the 
costs of non-compliance with visas and in so doing, make it more likely that 
a poor applicant will receive a visa. Thus, bonding systems may also 
improve access for the poor migrant to the U.S., where she typically 
significantly improves her earnings. 
Herein lies the crux of the matter. The real issue is not the bonding 
requirement. After all, immigration law already routinely uses market-based 
mechanisms to screen rich migrants. The question becomes why poor 
migrants should not have similar opportunities.  The real issue is the absence 
of opportunities in developing countries for poor people to access 
transparent credit facilities from formal financial institutions to finance 
bonds, leaving poor migrants at the mercy of black-market money lenders. 
This Article seeks to make labor mobility bankable by advocating a re-
conceptualization of guest worker visas as a type of property, namely, 
licenses for temporary admission to the U.S.  If appropriately designed, these 
visa-licenses could be collateral-like devices, which allow poor migrants to 
access transparent law-bound credit markets. 
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Introduction 
Fully three decades ago Calabresi and Bobbit famously wrote about 
“tragic choices,” namely tough policy choices which offend deeply held 
values, and the accompanying “subterfuges,” that is, efforts by policy elites 
to shield such choices from public view. 2 Strangely, the “tragic choice” 
framework has not been applied in the context of U.S. immigration law, 
although current immigration policy is rife with tragic choices and 
subterfuges.  A case in question is the issue of commodification of visas. It is 
clear that U.S. policy makers remain deeply committed to maintaining an 
illusion that U.S. visas are not being “sold.” 3 For example, in the current 
financial crisis, U.S. policy makers have not auctioned visas to wealthy 
overseas investors who are willing to invest in depressed real-estate, a policy 
suggestion that gained considerable currency as a mechanism of stemming 
the sub-prime crisis.4  
2 GUIDO CALABRESI and PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).  The term 
“subterfuge” is from Calabresi. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES 
AND THE LAW 88 (1985). The tragic choice framework has most famously been 
applied to the issue of health care rationing. See, e.g., Leonard Fleck, Just Health 
Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597 
(1992) For example, how do we decide which sick patients receive expensive liver 
transplants? Their moral culpability in damaging their current liver, for example, 
through alcoholism? Their ability to pay for the transplant? Their likelihood of long-
term survival? Their historical or future contribution to society?  
3  Indeed a recent article in the Economist makes precisely this point. See The 
Price of Entry: A New Proposal from Gary Becker to make a market in immigration, 
THE ECONOMIST, June 24, 2010 available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/16424085?story_id=16424085 (noting that 
Becker’s proposal to auction visas, while innovative, has almost no chance of 
success, given the background hostility to such ideas).  This public posture of elites 
fits with a broader public suspicion of selling visas as evidenced by polling, since 
visas often signify a potential route to citizenship. See generally the polling data 
discussed in Shaheen Borna and James M. Stearns, The Ethics and Efficacy of 
Selling National Citizenship, 37 J. OF BUS. ETHICS, 193 (May 2002). 
4  The New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman is the most notable 
proponent of this policy. Friedman interviewed Indian elites, who cited the 
willingness of Indian investors to invest in foreclosed U.S. properties, if immigration 
benefits would attach to such investments. Thomas Friedman, The Open Door 
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A31. 
Yet, U.S. immigration practice has long made concessions to 
commodification. First, there are the “unofficial concessions” to 
commodification at the margins.  One might call these “informal 
subterfuges,” as a cottage industry has developed with labor brokers and 
coyotes charging applicants high fees to gain entry to the United States.5  
Notably, these fees are pervasive, not only in the “black” and “gray” markets 
(that is, markets outside of the formal economy, sometimes involving 
inherently illegal activities such as undocumented border crossings). They 
are also pervasive in the “white” markets (within the formal economy). For 
example, elite applicants typically employ attorneys and sometimes lobbyists 
who charge high fees to navigate the complexities of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).6 There are also the official concessions to 
commodification. Indeed, the INA mandates that some migrants “pay” very 
high prices to obtain the right to enter the U.S. A case in question is certain 
elite visa applicants who must invest significant sums in the U.S. economy as 
a condition of both obtaining and maintaining their visas.7  
While in other countries, the poor migrant, like the rich migrant, may 
pledge something of value as a condition of receiving her visa, in the U.S., 
the poor migrant has no such option.8 Rather, the poor migrant faces another 
kind of “tragic choice.” She may pay a coyote an astronomical fee to 
                                                           
5  I learned this through an interview with the sociologist, David Spener who 
has conducted ethnographic research on coyote transportation networks and the 
exorbitant fees that undocumented migrants pay to coyotes and brokers.  
6  See, e.g., Evan Perez and Gregory White, FBI Lets Barred Tycoon Visit 
U.S., WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at A1 (noting that the lobbyist and former 
Presidential candidate Bob Dole successfully lobbied for a visa for a Russian 
billionaire, Oleg Deripaska who had previously been barred from the U.S. due to 
concerns regarding links to organized crime). 
7  For example see 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(5) (1994) (providing for visas to be 
issued to immigrants who invest at least one million dollars in a start-up American 
business that generates full-time jobs for ten United States citizens or lawful 
residents.)  For a description of how this works in practice, see The Economist Blog, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/06/immigration_0. 
8  This is true in rich Asian countries such as Singapore and in nearly all of 
the Middle Eastern states who rely heavily on migrant workers.  See Dovelyn 
Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland, Circular Migration and Development: 
Trends, Policy Routes, and Ways Forward, (Migration Pol. Inst.), April 2007, 
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MigDevPB_041807.pdf; see also 
ORN BODVARRSON and HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG, TEMPORARY MIGRATION 
INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION AND OTHER VARIATIONS ON THE STANDARD MODEL 261-
84 (2009). 
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transport her across the border illegally at great risk to her personal safety, or 
she simply cannot come. There is a reason for this tragic choice, namely, a 
failure of U.S. policy makers to face head-on a primary challenge of 
immigration law: it is notoriously difficult to screen a poor low-skilled visa 
applicant who is typically not well placed to provide documentary evidence 
of credible ties to her country of origin, which will lead her to return home at 
the end of her visa’s tenure. Typically, the poor low-skilled applicant pledges 
to be law-abiding during her tenure in the U.S., specifically promising to 
avoid visa-overstay. Yet, the high rates of visa overstay among migrants 
generally and among poor low-skilled temporary workers in particular, 9 is 
evidence of a quintessential problem of information asymmetry.10 That is, 
the typical applicant knows much more about whether she will return to her 
home country than the U.S. government; the government typically has no 
way of evaluating the sincerity of her commitments. To overcome this 
                                                           
9 Nearly half of the undocumented population of twelve million overstayed 
their visas. See Ted Robbins, Nearly Half of Illegal Immigrants Overstay Visa, on 
All Things Considered (July 14, 2006) available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5485917.  Moreover, the U.S. 
is unable to trace most persons who overstay their visas.  See also James C. 
McKinley and Julia Preston, U.S. Can’t Trace Visitors on Expired Visas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at A1 (noting that over 40% of the undocumented migrants 
were previously documented and overstayed). Although overstay rates among guest 
workers are lower now than they were in the past, historically, high overstay rates 
among guest workers were a primary contributor to the size of the undocumented 
population.  Philip L. Martin and Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Mirage of Mexican 
Guest Workers, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./ Dec. 2001 at 117.  The size of the 
undocumented population (of twelve million) is taken from the work of Douglas 
Massey, a sociologist who is a leading authority on this issue. See DOUGLAS S. 
MASSEY, Borderline Madness:  America’s Counterproductive Immigration Policy, 
in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129 (CAROL SWAIN, ed. 2008).  Other estimates 
generally indicate that there are between ten and fourteen million undocumented 
persons. See DAVID A. MARTIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., TWILIGHT STATUSES:  A 
CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION (2005); JEFFREY S. 
PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS:  NUMBERS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 3 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.   
10 Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of 
Immigration Law, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 809 (2007) (pointing out the difficulties of 
information asymmetry); see also HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: 
THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 15–37 
(2006) (pointing out a further difficulty is that even a sincere visa applicant who 
promises to return to his home country may change his mind once he has been in the 
U.S. for a period of time).  
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challenge, this Article recommends what economists popularly term 
“hostage-taking,” that is, the visa applicant should have to post a bond. 11  
While a bonding proposal initially may seem radical, bonding has a 
long heritage in many aspects of the common law.12 Moreover, the U.S. 
government is already heavily involved with bonding regimes on its overseas 
military bases, albeit indirectly. Immigration authorities in the Middle East 
typically require guest workers to post bonds. In keeping with these 
requirements, Halliburton, the military contractor fills many of the 
housekeeping positions on American military bases in the Gulf by posting 
bonds for guest workers.13   Yet despite the obvious applicability of bonding 
to U.S immigration challenges,14 it is curious that there has been little 
                                                           
11 The term “hostage taking” comes from the economics literature. See Oliver 
E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 
AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983).  In this particular context, the pejorative term “hostage” 
refers to a government’s ability to hold hostage something of value to the alien until 
he exits the country.   
12 See, e.g., THE LAW OF MISCELLANEOUS AND COMMERCIAL SURETY BONDS 
(American Bar Association, eds. TODD C. KAZLOW AND BRUCE C. KING 2001) 
(leading text on bonding in the commercial context); Eric Helland and Alexander 
Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private Law Enforcement from 
Bail Jumping, 47 J. LAW & ECON. 93 (2004) (discussing the effectiveness of bail 
bonding systems in diverse contexts); Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: II. 
Preliminary Preceedings: Bail, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 311 (2008) 
(summary of the current law on bail bonding in the criminal law context).  
13 Halliburton typically hires South Asians for these positions. Nizar Latif, 
Iraqis Angry at Loss of Jobs to Asians, THE NATIONAL (Nov. 7, 2009) 
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091108/FOREIGN/711079
862/1135.    
14 Indeed, bonding is currently utilized in limited circumstances in the INA.  
INA § 212(d)(3)(A)(2006) (“The Attorney General shall prescribe conditions, 
including the exaction of such bonds as may be necessary, to control and regulate the 
admission and return of inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission under 
this paragraph.”); INA § 213 (2006) (regarding admission of aliens upon giving 
bond or undertaking and its return upon permanent departure); INA § 214 (2006) 
(“The admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for 
such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations 
prescribe, including when he deems necessary the giving of a bond with sufficient 
surety in such sum and containing such conditions as the Attorney General shall 
prescribe . . .”).  See also STEPHEN LEGOMSKY AND CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 651, 818 (5th ed. 2009); THOMAS ALEINIKOFF, 
ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY  748 (6th ed. 2003). 
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discussion of broader bonding proposals.15 This Article is an effort to begin 
that dialogue.  
Admittedly, there are problems with bonding regimes in the U.S. 
context, which justify the utilization of the “tragic choice” metaphor. In a 
country resolutely committed in its historical Ellis Island metaphors to the 
notion that it opens its borders to deserving migrants,16 regardless of their 
socio-economic status, bonding systems may reinforce a view that visas are 
being “sold.” However, immigration law already routinely uses market-based 
mechanisms to screen rich migrants. The question becomes why poor 
migrants should not have similar opportunities. The real issue is not the 
bonding requirement, but rather the absence of opportunities in developing 
countries for poor people to access credit facilities to finance bonds.  
While proposals for visa-bonding of guest workers are rarely 
discussed, skeptics of bonding regimes cite the Dickensian free-for-all that 
preceded modern immigration law.17 Fully half of white migrants in the early 
days of the Republic were bonded by their employers as a condition of their 
passage with the implicit cooperation of the government, which enforced the 
bonds. Upon arrival, migrants labored to pay off bonds in slave-like 
conditions; in contemporary times, bonded workers in the Gulf have been 
described as indentured servants. 18 Yet these concerns seem strangely out of 
                                                           
15 The exceptions are Jeffrey Manns and Peter Schuck. Manns’ exploration of 
the role of gatekeepers in immigration enforcement includes a brief discussion of 
bonding. Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of 
Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 889-90 (2006). Peter Schuck 
also briefly discusses bonding. Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A 
“White Paper”, 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 667, 682-85 (1997). 
16 Aristide Zolberg’s details the evolution of this Ellis Island metaphor of the 
“deserving migrant” in his Introduction. ARISTIDE ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: 
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 1-24 (2007).  
17 Ayelet Shachar is a prominent skeptic. See AYELET SCHACHAR, THE 
BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY 22 (2009).  
18 See ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY Introduction (2004) (for a discussion of 
early white migrants) and   Human Rights Watch, Swept Under the Rug: Abuses 
Against Domestic Workers Around the World, (July 27, 2006) (for a discussion of 
the working conditions of bonded workers in the Middle East). Although indentured 
laborers often worked under difficult conditions, indentured servitude was distinct, 
of course, from slavery.  Foner’s text famously elucidates the distinction between the 
two institutions. In modern times, the distributive justice questions have particular 
resonance given that poor bonded migrants are disproportionately likely to be racial 
minorities. This is certainly the case in the Middle East where bonded migrants are 
10 
place in the modern U.S., where bonds are enforceable with appropriate 
human rights protections. Moreover, critics face an undeniable irony: the 
average migrant worker sees the value of her labor jump five times in the 
U.S.19 By lowering overstay rates, bonding systems may improve U.S. labor 
market access for poor migrants whose welfare motivates distributive justice 
critiques in the first place.20 Thus, the goal should be to pursue transparent 
bonding proposals, while mitigating distributive justice concerns. One 
solution would be to provide incentives for employers to finance bonds. 
However, there will always be worthy applicants who cannot find employers 
that will post bonds on their behalves.21 Thus, applicants should be able to 
finance bonds on their own steam.22  
                                                                                                                                            
comprised almost entirely of South Asians. Critics have raised the prospect of a 
separate underclass of poor migrants.  In the U.S. context although bonding regimes 
are not yet widely utilized, this concern of a separate underclass has particular 
resonance and is raised in several law review articles, especially in the context of 
guest worker programs. For skeptical discussions of guest worker programs more 
generally, see MOTOMURA, supra note 10 at 15–37. For more targeted critiques of 
guest worker programs, see Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration: 
Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 219 (2007). 
19 See Michael Clemens, et al., The Place Premium: Wage Differences for 
Identical Workers Across the U.S. Border, Working Paper 55, available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/16352 (Dec. 2008) (discussing the 
“place premium,” namely the wage gain accruing to foreign workers who arrive in 
the U.S. and finding that migration has a much more immediate impact on poverty 
alleviation than any other policy since the wage differentials between the U.S. and 
most developing countries are so great)  
20  Indeed, bonding proposals have recently gained currency in Britain for 
precisely this reason. For example, South Asian lobby groups have advocated 
bonding proposals on the grounds that it would improve access for South Asians to 
Britain. The Times Online, Britons Face Jail If Relatives Overstay Their Visa (June 
25, 2008), available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4211653.ece.  
21 See National Labor Migration Policy for Sri Lanka, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/mpolicy_srilanka_en
.pdf.  This finding justifies the emphasis on institutional innovations that allow guest 
workers to finance their own bonds independent of finding willing employers.  
22  This distributive justice intuition – namely enhancing access to visas - is 
supported by the work of a number of leading political theorists. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. 
CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY:  A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION 
OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS (2000); DUAL NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND 
FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE:  THE REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP 
(RANDALL HANSEN & PATRICK WEIL eds., 2002); JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 136, 140 
11 
As recent history in developed country markets has shown, the road 
to extending credit to the poor is rife with potential pitfalls.23 Indeed, the 
current state of credit markets for poor people in the developing world is not 
unlike the market here in the U.S. before protections for poor borrowers 
proliferated at the federal and state levels.24 Although it may not be widely 
recognized outside of specialist circles, the poor have long been able to 
borrow.25  Even in the early days of the Great Depression, there was a 
thriving market of black market money lenders.26 The problem is that the 
poor’s financiers typically operate in the black market, extracting terms that 
are unjustifiable in a modern market economy. Money lenders have long 
been understood to demand onerous terms; one need only consider the 
biblical condemnation of the abuses of money lenders in Jersusalem’s 
temple.27 
In modern times, this is how South Asian guest workers who post 
bonds to work in the Middle East often finance their bonds; they execute 
loan contracts with local money lenders. These money lenders may enforce 
contracts with implicit threats of violence.28 Their threats are credible. 
Indeed, Nepalese farmers borrow money for fertilizer by sometimes pledging 
their daughters as “collateral;” their daughters work as indentured laborers to 
the money lenders until the loan is paid off.29  The same Nepalese farmer 
may need a loan to underwrite a bond for a work visa in Dubai, where he can 
                                                                                                                                            
(WARREN F. SCHWARTZ ed., 1995); James Woodward, Commentary:  Liberalism 
and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT:  ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL 
MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 59, 82 (BRIAN BARRY & ROBERT E. GOODIN 
eds., 1992).  
23  The Introduction to Barr and Blank’s text makes this point particularly well. 
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT, AND BANKING AMONG LOW-
INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (MICHAEL BARR AND R.M. BLANK, eds. 2009). 
24  See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: 
INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY (1974). 
25  Jill Lepore, Annals of Finance: “I.O.U.,” THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 13, 2009 
at 34. 
26 See COLEMAN, supra note 24 
27  Mathew 21:12 (detailing Jesus’ criticisms of money lenders in the temple). 
28 See generally, DARYL COLLINS, ET AL., PORTFOLIOS OF THE POOR: HOW 
THE WORLD’S POOR LIVE ON $2 A DAY (2009).  
29 Ashoka, the global association of social entrepreneurs has widely 
publicized the plight of Nepalese girls who are pledged to moneylenders as 
indentured servants. See Gregg, Tully, Freeing Nepali Girls from Indentured 
Servitude, http://www.changemakers.com/enus/node/7822/ (last visited Jan. 12, 
2010). 
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increase his earnings several-fold. While it would be tragic to deny him this 
opportunity, in the absence of access to credit in a transparent, regulated 
setting, he may find himself making a similarly tragic choice that involves 
pledging his daughter. 
This is the world as it currently is for the developing country poor 
who seek financing. This Article is an attempt to map a trajectory to a world 
as it could be. Our distributive justice commitments counsel providing 
enhanced access to visas through enhanced access to financing. 
Simultaneously, we must set a certain threshold of protections that should 
exist for a proposal to be acceptable; at a minimum, financing for poor 
migrants must be obtained in a law-bound context. 30 One could hardly be 
comfortable with migrants financing the bonds that underlie their visas to the 
U.S. in the black market, with a shadowy world of money lenders and 
coyotes extending loans (although ironically, this is precisely what transpires 
now, when undocumented workers borrow money through deferred 
financing from the same coyotes who surreptitiously transport them across 
the border).  Although there is virtually nothing in the legal scholarship31 on 
either secured or unsecured lending at the “bottom of the pyramid” in 
developing countries,32 a realistic assessment of the current state of lending 
                                                           
30 Of course, even when financing occurs in the context of a law-bound 
framework, a range of problems may occur as the recent global financial crisis has 
reminded us.  If the experience of student borrowers and poor sub-prime borrowers 
in the U.S. is any guide, prospective guest workers could be particularly susceptible 
to predatory lending practices. This reinforces the need for vigorous regulation of 
lenders.  For a summary of the issues in this regard, see 
http://www.newamerica.net/programs/education_policy/higher_ed_watch/student_lo
an_scan and http://www.naacp.org/news/press/2009-03-13/index.htmdal 
(summarizing lawsuits on predatory lending). 
31 Michael Barr and Ronald Mann’s work on financial services for low-
income Americans is a model of the type of work that would be helpful on financial 
services for the developing country poor. See, e.g., Chapters 3 and 8 in BARR AND 
BLANK, supra note 23. However, there is minimal work in the legal scholarship on 
lending to the poor in the developing world. An exception is Hal S. Scott, The State 
of Banking in Developing Countries in ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL AND 
CONSUMER LAW: PAPERS FROM THE FOURTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW (DONALD B. 
KING ED., WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., INC., 1992), which includes a brief discussion on 
the issue. 
32 The term “bottom of the pyramid” was first used by President Roosevelt in 
one of his famous fireside chats during the Great Depression. It has gained currency 
among development economists who study poverty in the developing world. See 
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to the poor (as discussed in the development finance literature) confirms that 
the prospects for formal financial institutions extending credit are not 
promising. Given that cash diversion is a particular risk in the informal 
economies that are typically pervasive in developing countries, formal 
financial institutions generally follow the maxim “no collateral: no loan.”33  
For the poor, this has generally resulted in “no loan.”34  Moreover, the legal 
systems in many developing countries do not reliably enforce loan contracts. 
This only exacerbates the difficulties of formal financial intermediation for 
the poor. The question becomes: what would it take to create incentives for 
bankers in the developing world to finance visa-bonds in the formal sector? 
To elucidate this question, the author conducted a qualitative field study of 
guest workers and their bankers.  
The key move is to mitigate the inability of bankers to enforce what 
this Article terms “loan-for-visa-bond contracts,” that is the loan agreements 
underlying the financing that migrants will use to pay their bonds to obtain 
visas. This can be accomplished by making loan compliance a condition of 
visa-renewal.  That is, the U.S. government will commit to bankers that they 
                                                                                                                                            
generally C.K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID (2006) 
(popularizing the term and advocating market-based solutions to poverty); Stuart 
Hart, Capitalism at the Crossroads (2005) (same); but see Aneel Karnani, The 
Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: A Mirage, 49/4 Cal. Management J. 90, 111 
(2007) (pointing out the deficiencies of the term). 
33 In this particular instance, I utilize the term “collateral” here in its 
traditional sense, namely as property that is pledged as security against a debt. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (8th ed. 2004). “Security” is "collateral given 
or pledged to guarantee the fulfillment of an obligation; especially, the assurance that 
a creditor will be repaid . . . any money or credit extended to a debtor." Id. at 1384. 
Generally, I will generally use the terms security and collateral interchangeably in 
this article. Of course, the utilization of the term collateral in the phrase “visa as 
collateral” is metaphorical rather than literal. The visa is not collateral in the 
traditional sense that is something of value pledged to the lender that can be enforced 
against in the event of default on a loan. The visa cannot be possessed by the lender. 
 Instead, the loan is “secured” by the value of the visa-license to the borrower, the 
promise of the government to revoke the visa if the borrower defaults, and the 
possibility that the lender may recoup some of the loan proceeds even in the event 
that the borrower defaults if the lender aids in the process of finding the non-
compliant alien.   
34 Phillip Bond & Ashok Rai, Collateral Substitutes in Microfinance (2002) 
available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/develop/tdw02/rai-021118.pdf.  
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will only renew a visa if an applicant is properly servicing the loan that 
underlies the bond associated with the visa. In exchange, the bank will 
commit to thoroughly evaluate the applicant’s risk profile as a condition of 
extending the loan.  In so doing, the proposal seriously mitigates the 
challenges of enforcing loan contracts, while simultaneously mitigating the 
challenges that the U.S. government currently experiences in evaluating the 
risk profiles of potential migrants. Notably, these visas would be modeled35 
on other government licenses that function as collateral-like devices. 36  In 
the world as it could be, labor mobility would have become bankable in the 
formal sector.  
How would the proposal work in practice? While the proposal 
clearly has broader applicability, I am concerned here primarily with guest 
worker visas. The guest worker provisions of the INA would be revised to 
codify a punitive bond arrangement that will increase the cost of a breach for 
a visa-recipient who overstays.  In the new system, the visa officer in the 
local Embassy would retain her critical role as a primary gatekeeper, but this 
role would be supplemented by a bank acting as a secondary gatekeeper. To 
this end, rather than issuing a visa, the visa officer would issue the 
prospective visa-recipient with a provisional “visa license.”  This visa license 
would signify conditional approval, contingent on a demonstrated ability to 
post a bond.  The prospective visa-recipient would then present her 
conditional visa-license to a bank as part of her loan application. By 
providing only conditional approval, the U.S. would be seeking further 
assurance from the bank that the prospective visa-recipient has a good risk 
profile. In the event that the guest worker later defaults (on her loan or on the 
terms of her visa) putting the bond at risk, the bank will be properly 
motivated to find the defaulting guest worker. The amount of the bond that is 
recouped will be indexed to how quickly the bank is able to provide evidence 
that the non-compliant alien has exited the U.S.; the bank or its agent will 
have incentives to either “snitch” or encourage the alien to self-deport. 
                                                           
35 The term is Blocher’s play on Reich’s famous term “the new property”. See 
Joseph Blocher, Reputation as Property in Virtual Economies, 118 YALE L.J. Pocket 
Part 120 (2009); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
See Eleanor Brown, Visa as New “New Property,” (Work in Progress).   
36 Taxi-cab medallions, for example, are among the licenses that are routinely 
used in secured transactions. See, e.g., Katrina Wyman, Is Bentham Right?: The 
Case of New York City Taxicab Medallions (on file with author). 
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This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I critiques the current 
approach of U.S. immigration law to screening guest workers and lays out 
the bonding proposal.  Part II discusses the crux of the problem – motivating 
third parties to finance visa-bonds.  Crucially, if appropriately designed, 
these visas will constitute the ideal type of collateral-like device, in that they 
will be highly valuable to the borrower, but less valuable to the lender.  Part 
III further elucidates why visa-as-collateral would work. Developing country 
legal systems may have no credibility with their banking sectors. Banks 
make deals, that is, specific accommodations for individual borrowers, rather 
than relying on rules.37 In contrast, the American government is considered a 
credible threat-maker. Banks will not have cut deals because they will be 
secure in the knowledge that the U.S. will enforce the rules and refuse to 
renew a visa in the event of a visa-bond loan default. Part IV focuses on a 
primary advantage of the proposal, namely the outsourcing of both the 
screening and enforcement function to bankers. The Conclusion addresses 
the concern that visa-as-collateral constitutes an unseemly concession to 
commodification38 since market-based mechanisms of allocation are 
considered inappropriate in distributing certain quasi-public goods.39 This is 
a classic instance of what I term “facilitative commodification,” with the 
classic trade-offs of proposals that seek to improve the opportunity sets of 
the poor, while simultaneously improving compliance. This proposal 
accomplishes immigration law goals in a manner that reduces “subterfuges,” 
and renders the choices made somewhat less “tragic,” particularly for the 
poor. 
 
                                                           
37 I am indebted to Lant Pritchett for pointing this out to me. See Hallward-
Dreimer, et al., Deals versus Rules: Uncertainty in Policy Implementation in Africa 
(Feb. 27, 2009)(unpublished manuscript, National Bureau for Economic Research).  
38 See MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996) (critique of 
“universal commodification,” namely the tendency to judge everything that we value 
according to the willingness of individuals to pay for it in the marketplace).  
39 I recognize that I am utilizing the term “public good” in an unconventional 
sense in describing visas, and I am borrowing this utilization from the RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION (MARTHA ERTMAN AND JOAN WILLIAMS, eds 2005.), See Martha 
M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, Preface: Freedom, Equality, and the Many Futures 
of Commodification, 1-7; Margaret Jane Radin and Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: 
The Subject and Object of Commodification, 8-29 in RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (eds. MARTHA M. 
ERTMAN and JOAN C. WILLIAMS, 2005).  
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 Part I: IMPROVING SCREENING: BONDING AT THE BOTTOM 
OF THE PYRAMID 
A.  Disproportionate Emphasis on Due Diligence and Assurances 
Consider the following fact pattern regularly encountered by a Kuwaiti 
immigration officer:  a South Asian worker submits an application for a 
temporary guest worker visa that would allow him to take a house-keeping 
position on an American military base. The Kuwaiti immigration officer is 
concerned about two potential difficulties with the application. First, the 
prospective migrant may overstay her visa. Second, the applicant may 
impose welfare costs on the state.  
Kuwait regularly requires that a bond be posted with the Kuwaiti 
government as a condition of entry for guest workers. Notably, the bond will 
be forfeited if the guest worker fails to meet any one of three conditions: (1) 
providing accurate information about historical behavior, that is, her past 
record of law abidance; (2) abiding by the visa terms, including a 
requirement that she not impose welfare costs on the Kuwaiti government 
and (3) exiting Kuwait in the prescribed time period.40 Since the military 
employs contractors who utilize guest workers in Kuwait, the American 
government is regularly involved with such bonding arrangements, albeit 
often indirectly.41 
                                                           
40 Typically, the amounts that South Asian guest workers pay in relation to 
their earning power in their countries of origin are astronomical. For example, the 
average bond is often equivalent to the annual salary of the average Sri Lankan 
worker. Human Rights Watch, Exported and Exposed: Abuses Against Sri Lankan 
Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Nov. 13 2007) at iv.noting that bonds are typically prohibitive for the average Sri 
Lankan in relation to their PPP (purchasing power parity). The PPP of an average 
citizen in Sri Lanka is USD 4,460.  PPP is often utilized by development economists 
to reflect the real purchasing power of an average citizen in relation to a standardized 
basket of goods (food, shelter etc.) World Bank, Gross National Income Per Capita, 
Atlas Method and PPP, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. The 
average bond appears to exceed the amount needed to deter non-compliance; it may 
include excess (and perhaps illicit) rents for labor brokers and government officials.  
41 Even though the U.S. government typically does not post the bond, it 
usually retains a contractor such as Halliburton who in turn retains a labor broker 
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Now let us move to the United States and consider an American 
immigration officer facing a similar fact pattern. The applicant for a 
temporary guest worker visa begs for favorable consideration, seeking to 
distinguish herself from similarly situated applicants who have been non-
compliant in the past. 42 Although rarely articulated in this manner, U.S. 
immigration law generally addresses this challenge by utilizing a two-fold 
strategy that is familiar from Anglo-American contract law.  
       First, in an effort to deal with the challenges of obtaining reliable 
information concerning the applicant’s historical behavior, U.S. immigration 
officials conduct “due diligence.” A web of laws allow the government to 
                                                                                                                                            
who posts the bond or ensures that such bond is posted by the South Asian guest 
worker.  Given that the guest worker is typically unbanked with no access to credit; 
he generally borrows this money from the labor broker who arranges his visa and his 
job. He signs a contract under which his salary is paid to the labor broker until the 
load is repaid. It appears that implicit interest rate is very high. Interview with Nasra 
Shah, University of Kuwait. 
42  The reader should be aware that the guest worker visas that are discussed in 
this Article raise profound questions of justice, which are beyond the scope of this 
paper and should be the subject of a later work.  There is an ongoing and well-
documented tension between the state’s interest in the provision of low-cost labor 
and its concern with the protection of human rights more generally.  These concerns 
include but are not limited to the following:  whether the presence of a large-scale 
population of temporary guests institutionalizes the exclusion of noncitizens from 
the constitutional mainstream, undermines political community, and denigrates the 
value of citizenship; whether these programs undermine wages and workplace 
protections for both guests and native workers; and whether such programs 
legitimate the application of a broader “trade paradigm” to human beings that 
commodifies labor. I am fully cognizant of these concerns, which provide fertile 
ground for further work.  The following is a partial list of references that address 
these concerns. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 56–61 (1983) (opposing guest worker programs on the 
grounds that they do not conform to the liberal egalitarian principles that govern full 
membership in a just state); see also CANADIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AT THE 
TURN OF THE CENTURY:  EXEMPLARY ESSAYS (R. BEINER and W. NORMAN eds., 
2000); JOSEPH H. CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY:  A 
CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS (2000); DUAL 
NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE:  
THE REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP (RANDALL HANSEN & PATRICK WEIL eds., 2002); 
Louis Michael Seidman, Fear and Loathing at the Border, in JUSTICE IN 
IMMIGRATION 136, 140 (WARREN F. SCHWARTZ ed., 1995); James Woodward, 
Commentary:  Liberalism and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT:  ETHICAL ISSUES IN 
THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 59, 82 (BRIAN BARRY 
& ROBERT E. GOODIN eds., 1992).  For a discussion of the impact of low-skilled 
alien workers on wages of citizen workers, see generally GEORGE BORJAS, FRIENDS 
OR STRANGERS:  THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (1990) (noting 
the disproportionate impact on the most disadvantaged, including urban residents 
and African Americans).  See also MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING supra note 
10; Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, supra note 18; Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration, supra note 18.  
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ascertain historical and likely future behavior of any visa applicant, including 
prospective guest workers (by mandating, for example, in certain instances 
that the applicant must provide evidence of past good behavior such police 
reports and the evidence of likely good behavior in the future such as assets 
in the home country to which the visa applicant is likely to return).43 Second, 
in an effort to buttress the accuracy of the applicant’s assertions regarding 
historical behavior, it also asks the applicant to provide assurances and that 
the information provided is accurate.44 In the event that the information 
                                                           
43 See INA §§ 101, 214 (a)(1) (“The admission to the United States of any 
alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the 
Attorney General may by regulations prescribe . . .  to insure that at the expiration of 
such time or upon failure to maintain the status under which he was admitted, or to 
maintain any status subsequently acquired under section 248 , such alien will depart 
from the United States. [ . . . ]; (b) Every alien 10/ (other than a nonimmigrant 
described in subparagraph (L) or (V) of section 101(a)(15), and other than a 
nonimmigrant described in any provision of section 101(a)(15)(H)(i) except 
subclause (b1) of such section) shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he 
establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of application for a 
visa, and the immigration officers, at the time of application for admission, that he is 
entitled to a nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15) (ii) (a) having a residence 
in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming 
temporarily to the United States to perform agricultural labor or services, as defined 
by the Secretary of Labor in regulations and including agricultural labor defined in 
section 3121(g) of 3bbb/ the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, agriculture as defined 
in section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(f)), and the 
pressing of apples for cider on a farm, of a temporary or seasonal nature [ . . . ]”). 
Although the guidance from the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs does 
not appear to contain a specific reference to guest worker visas, the reference to the 
obligations placed on other temporary admittees may serve as a guide.  See, e.g., 
U.S. Department of State, Visitor Visa- Business and Pleasure, available at 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1262.html, (“The presumption in the 
law is that every visitor visa applicant is an intending immigrant. Therefore, 
applicants for visitor visas must overcome this presumption by demonstrating that: 
The purpose of their trip is to enter the U.S. for business, pleasure, or medical 
treatment; That they plan to remain for a specific, limited period; Evidence of funds 
to cover expenses in the United States; Evidence of compelling social and economic 
ties abroad; and That they have a residence outside the U.S. as well as other binding 
ties that will insure their return abroad at the end of the visit.”).  
44 See DS-156: Department of State Nonimmigrant Visa Application, 
available at https://evisaforms.state.gov/ds156.asp,  (“41. I certify that I have read 
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shared by the migrant in the due diligence process turns out later to be false, 
the penalty is usually visa-revocation.45  However, given the high overstay 
rates among temporary visitors,46 it is apparent that the traditional emphasis 
on due diligence and assurances, and the threat of visa revocation in the face 
of false statements, has not been effective. 
B.  A Potential Solution: The Kuwaiti Approach 
This is a quintessential case of information asymmetry, in which one 
party to the transaction knows more about a relevant fact than the other 
party. The applicant is highly likely to know more than the immigration 
officer about facts which are critical to determining whether she should 
receive a visa.  Going forward, I will refer to the party with lesser 
information, who is assessing the reliability of such information, as the 
“gatekeeper” and the party with better information, who seeks to convince 
the gatekeeper of her trustworthiness as the “applicant.”47  The economics 
literature provides an obvious solution to problems of information 
                                                                                                                                            
and understood all the questions set forth in this application and the answers I have 
furnished on this form are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.  I 
understand that any false or misleading statement may result in the permanent 
refusal of a visa or denial of entry into the United States. I understand that 
possession of a visa does not automatically entitle the bearer to enter the United 
States of America upon arrival at a port of entry if he or she is found inadmissible.”).   
45 Although the guidance from the State Department’s Bureau of Consular 
Affairs does not appear to contain a specific reference to guest worker visas, the 
warnings to other temporary admittees  of the possibility of visa-revocation may 
serve as a guide. U.S. Department of State, Visitor Visa- Business and Pleasure, 
available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1262.html 
(“Misrepresentation of a Material Facts, or Fraud: Attempting to obtain a visa by the 
willful misrepresentation of a material fact, or fraud, may result in the permanent 
refusal of a visa or denial of entry into the United States.”).  
46  McKinley and  Preston, supra note 9.  
47 In the Kuwaiti fact pattern, if the American military employer posts the 
bond itself, the Kuwaiti government has essentially outsourced the gate-keeping 
function to the American military. However, the American military is likely to sub-
contract this function to a labor/bond-broker (that is, a private company which refers 
workers and assumes the bond-posting responsibility), and in so doing, outsource the 
gate-keeping function to the labor/bond-broker. 
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asymmetry and it is the Kuwaiti answer: prospective migrants should be 
required to post bonds.48 
There are two distinct situations in which the gate keeper is likely to be 
at an informational disadvantage. The first situation involves historical facts 
concerning the past behavior of the applicant, for example, whether the 
applicant has complied with laws or imposed welfare costs on the state in the 
past. The second situation involves predicting the applicant’s future 
behavior. Specifically, will she abide by the terms of her visa, exiting by the 
prescribed date and not imposing welfare costs on the government in the 
interim?  
In the ensuing analysis, I distinguish between information regarding 
historical behavior and information predictive of future behavior. Why 
distinguish between the two? In one sense, they are inextricably intertwined -
- the historical behavior of a visa applicant may well be a predictor of future 
behavior (indeed, one could imagine making this case statistically). 
However, the applicant’s historical behavior can be differentiated from her 
future behavior because future commitments necessarily involve moral 
hazard.  
                                                           
48 For a good high-level introduction to the role of bonds in the legal 
scholarship, David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 375 (1990) Charny discusses two other types of non-legal sanctions 
including reputational sanctions and the loss of psychic goods such as self-esteem.  
In a previous paper, I discussed both these typologies of non-legal sanctions in the 
context of immigration. See Eleanor Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance, 
77 Fordham Law Review 2475 (2009).   
 Another good summary of the use of bonds in resolving the problems of 
information asymmetry is Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing 
Transactions, 87 GEO. L. J. 2225 (1999). Jeffrey Manns briefly discusses the 
potential advantages of bonds in the immigration context. Jeffrey Manns, supra note 
15. For discussions of bonding in the context of gatekeeping, see also, Stephen J. 
Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. Rev. 916 (1998); Stephen J. 
Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
279 (2000); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986). Papers which discuss 
economic models of bonding arrangements include Klein & Leffler, The Role of 
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 
(1981); L. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 (1980); and 
the seminal Williamson article, supra note 11, at 519. 
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In light of this, ideally, any device that seeks to mitigate the challenges 
of information asymmetry will not only increase the applicant’s incentive to 
be honest about past behavior (since the applicant will have reason to believe 
that she will be caught lying by the gatekeeper); it will also have an ongoing 
effect, so that the applicant is continuously motivated to abide by her visa 
terms in the future. Notably, the foregoing Kuwaiti bonding arrangement 
accomplishes both these goals. The bond many be forfeited either in the 
event that the guest worker is found to have lied about historical behavior or 
in the event that she does not comply with the conditions of her visa in the 
future, and in both cases, deportation ensues as well. In the American fact 
pattern, unlike the Kuwaiti fact pattern, there is no ongoing mechanism of 
motivating future compliance other than the threat of visa-revocation and 
subsequent deportation (which lack credibility particularly if the likelihood 
of deportation is low as a practical matter). 
C. Designing a Bond 
Let us take a moment to consider the ideal characteristics of a bond. 
A bond should be designed asymmetrically so that if the gatekeeper executes 
on the bond, the visa recipient would suffer a significant loss even as the 
gatekeeper realizes an insignificant gain.49  
First we begin with the recognition that the greater the potential loss 
for forfeiture of the bond, the less likely it is that the applicant will provide 
inaccurate information.  Notably, this is likely to be the case whether or not 
the information is historical or relates to the likely future compliance of the 
                                                           
49 The ideal “hostage” should constrain the visa-recipient but not tempt the 
gatekeeper. The concept is often captured in the metaphor of the “ugly princess” 
whose father offers her as a bond to the king of a warring kingdom as evidence of his 
intention to abide by a peace treaty.  Given familial ties, she is much more valuable 
to her father than she is to the other king. See Williamson, supra note 14. The ugly 
princess has since been updated to the “puny prince.” See Robert Scott, A Relational 
Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 930 (1986). Other writers 
have recognized the importance on constraints on gatekeeper inclinations to act 
opportunistically, emphasizing reputation as the primary constraint on opportunistic 
behavior. See, e.g., Niloy Bose & Richard Cothren, Asymmetric Information and 
Loan Contracts in a Neoclassical Growth Model, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 423, 429-30 (1997); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the 
Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 527 (1981); D.  Gordon Smith, Venture 
Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 
133, 138-40 (1998). 
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applicant. If it relates to historical facts, the prospect of a future loss in the 
event that the information is later found to be inaccurate should create 
incentives for the applicant to be compliant. With respect to future visa 
compliance, the ongoing possibility of a loss should motivate the applicant to 
ensure that her behavior is compliant. In either event, what has been termed 
the bond’s “verificatory” power increases as the size of the bond increases.50 
However, as the size of the bond increases, so does the incentive for 
the gatekeeper to execute on the bond in an opportunistic manner, even if the 
applicant has not violated its terms.  This may not seem to be a real danger in 
the U.S. context, where there is transparency in immigration administration 
and intermediaries who finance bonds would presumably be regulated by 
some independent authority. However, in the Middle East, there have been 
allegations that government officials (in collusion with broker intermediaries, 
to whom guest workers sometimes pay high interest to post bonds on their 
behalf) have opportunistically threatened bond-forfeiture to force the early 
exit of law-abiding aliens.51 One obvious institutional design solution to this 
challenge is to ensure the establishment of a transparent mechanism with 
independent judges to determine the circumstances under which forfeiture is 
appropriate. While this innovation should mitigate this danger, it would still 
be ideal to design a bond that reduces the incentives for the gatekeeper to act 
                                                           
50 Mann, supra note 48.  
51 Human Rights Watch, Bad Dreams: Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant 
Workers in Saudi Arabia (July 13, 2004).  A further challenge is that bonds have 
sometimes not been returned, even when guest workers have met the conditions of 
their visas. The likelihood of such abuses even in an ostensibly law-bound regime is 
not low. Indeed, a similar problem occurred in the now-infamous Bracero 
(“farmhand”) guest-worker program, under which hundreds of thousands of Mexican 
guest workers travelled to the U.S. as agricultural workers between the 1942 and 
1964.  As an incentive to encourage return to Mexico, the U.S. government retained 
Social Security contributions, with a commitment that payments would be made to 
guest workers upon their return home to Mexico. However, such payments were 
made to many guest workers only after decades of litigation. For a general 
discussion of the program’s failings, see Douglas S. Massey & Zai Liang, The Long-
Term Consequences of a Temporary Worker Program: The US Bracero Experience, 
8 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 199 (1989).  The program was inaugurated under 
a bilateral agreement with Mexico during World War II to meet critical agricultural 
labor shortages and ultimately involved widespread visa overstays and deportations. 
See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE:  THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION 
AND THE I.N.S. (1992); BARBARA A. DRISCOLL, THE TRACKS NORTH:  THE 
RAILROAD BRACERO PROGRAM OF WORLD WAR II, at 53–55 (1999); ERNESTO 
GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR (1964).   
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opportunistically even while it continues to provide a sufficient deterrent to 
the visa-holder.   
There are other institutional design innovations that might lower the 
likelihood of opportunism by gatekeepers.  For example, in the contracting 
context, the literature discusses asymmetrically punitive bonds, in which the 
applicant posts a bond which has value that is particular to her (and is not 
likely to be realized at as high a price in the marketplace). Indeed, one might 
think of a range of items that have some peculiar personal value to the alien 
(such as family heirlooms, inherited land et al.), and as such, might meet 
these criteria.52 In so doing, the bond becomes far more valuable to the 
applicant than to the gatekeeper.   
The larger point is that an appropriately designed bond should be not 
merely compensatory, but also punitive. That is, the loss to the applicant 
should exceed the gain from providing inaccurate information (either as it 
relates to historical information or predicted future compliance) divided by 
the probability that such inaccuracy would later be discovered.  
D. The Implications of the Involvement of Financial Intermediaries  
Drawing on insights from the scholarship on contracts, one could 
imagine a number of bond-design innovations that would ensure that the 
bond is close to perfectly punitive. In the next section, to mitigate 
distributive justice concerns, I propose that the government should provide 
an incentive for third-party financial intermediaries to finance the bonds in a 
transparent manner. An additional advantage of this approach is that bond 
                                                           
52 For a discussion of this type of property, see Margaret Jane Radin, Property 
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-61 (1982) (arguing that some "objects 
are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we constitute 
ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world" and providing examples of "a 
wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a house").  There are also other institutional 
innovations which might be applicable. For example, Mann, supra note 48, discusses 
interlocking bond arrangements in which “the process for forfeiting the bonds is 
structured so that the lender effectively posts its reputation as a bond against 
improper execution of the bond posted by the borrower; the result is an interlocking 
verification arrangement, with each party posting a bond to the other.” Such an 
arrangement would perhaps have greater applicability if the government outsourced 
the gate-keeping function to some other entity (such as in the Kuwaiti example 
above).  
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financiers will have incentives to ensure that the bonds are appropriately 
punitive so as to mitigate the risk of default (on both the visa and the loan).  
Generally, bond financiers will have incentives to develop the 
appropriate innovations in bond-design. Indeed, a preliminary review of the 
scholarship on financing arrangements at the bottom of the pyramid indicates 
that financial intermediaries (often working in conditions of informality, and 
indeed, even illegality) have a range of mechanisms of estimating and 
pricing risk, and enforcing credit terms.53 Some of these mechanisms of 
enforcement would undoubtedly be impermissible in a transparent, law-
bound bond-financing program. Nevertheless, this literature supports the 
point that financial-intermediaries at the bottom of the pyramid like 
conventional financiers are able to create innovative devices for constraining 
risk such as hedging by spreading their loans among different populations. 
For example, money lenders will make loans to factory workers and farmers 
as opposed to only farmers, since farmers might all be similarly unable to 
service their loans in the event of an unanticipated event such as a drought. 
Indeed, in motivating financial intermediaries to finance visa-bonds, the 
government in essence may be outsourcing the bond-design process.54    
There is an additional advantage of the involvement of financial 
intermediaries. Bonding mechanisms provide additional information from 
other sources (known in the literature as “second order” information), which 
allows the gatekeeper a more reliable mechanism of determining the 
accuracy of the applicant’s original assertion (“first order” information). 
Notably the reliability of the second order information does not arise simply 
from the fact that its source is some entity other than the applicant.  Rather, 
the gatekeeper is still obligated to evaluate the second order information. 
This information review could be repeated iteratively until some external 
entity provides independent verification of the reliability of the 
information.55  An additional advantage of such a proposal would be that 
financial intermediaries would be properly motivated to independently verify 
the reliability of the information as a condition of extending a loan: indeed, 
this likely would constitute an essential part of their underwriting process.  
                                                           
53 STUART RUTHERFORD, THE POOR AND THEIR MONEY, Introduction, (2001).  
54 Id.  Nevertheless, the fact that the gatekeeper is ultimately the government 
(instead of a private party) may impose practical limitations on some of these 
arrangements. 
55 Professor Mann makes this point. Mann, supra note 48.  
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 E. The Relative Advantages of Bonding Arrangements 
1. Context Sensitivity 
The due diligence process provides little context sensitivity; at times 
the due diligence process over-reaches, and at other times it under-reaches, 
by requiring the same information of the law-abiding prospective migrant 
who is not an overstay risk as it does of the non-law-abiding prospective 
migrant who is an overstay risk. The bottom line is that due diligence 
processes are often ineffective and expensive.   
The emphasis on assurances also appears to be ineffective. By the 
time the government has realized that the information provided in the due 
diligence process is inaccurate and assurances have been violated, the visa 
recipient has usually disappeared into the underground economy.56 Thus, 
visa-revocation and the accompanying threat of deportation do not constitute 
a meaningful penalty for many migrants when the odds of ever being caught 
and deported are in their favor.57 
There is a more fundamental reason that the traditional approaches 
appear to be falling short of the goals of effective screening and sanctioning. 
As we have learned from the contracting context, formal legal rules are often 
inadequate when sensitivity to context is important to obtain appropriate 
commitments from parties with superior information. Through the 
application of formal legal rules, in isolation, the government may obtain 
commitments that are either disproportionate or insufficient given the special 
circumstances of a situation.   
For analogous reasons, it is unrealistic to expect the government to 
create and extract appropriate commitments from particular applicants on a 
                                                           
56 Martin and Teitelbaum, supra note 9; Demetrios G. Papademetriou, 
Migration, 109 FOREIGN POLICY, Winter 1997-98, at 15-31; Demetrios G. 
Papademetriou and Nicholas DiMarzio, A Preliminary Profile of Unapprehended 
Undocumented Aliens in Northern New Jersey: A Research Note, 19 INT’L 
MIGRATION REV., 746-59 (Winter 1985); Demetrios G. Papademetriou, European 
Labor Migration: Consequences for the Countries of Worker Origin, 22 INT’L 
STUDIES QUARTERLY 3, 377-408 (1978).  
57 Martin and Teitelbaum, supra note 9. 
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case-by-case basis. Indeed, even if it was possible to develop such 
commitments in broad form or on a case-by-case basis, enforcement through 
the legal process is likely to be prohibitively expensive. The benefit of a 
bonding system is that it draws on lessons from privately developed and 
enforced sanctioning arrangements that have been effective largely in the 
absence of intervention from public enforcers.  
2. Changing the Default Rule of Non-Enforcement 
Moreover, not only do bonding systems theoretically provide context 
sensitivity, they also change what I will refer to as the “default rule of non-
enforcement” for visa non-compliance. Economic sociologists who study 
immigration have demonstrated that documented aliens who become 
undocumented are easily absorbed into dense ethnic networks that facilitate 
employment in the absence of documentation.58 Public enforcers generally 
are unable to penetrate these networks without incurring extraordinary 
costs.59 Since a defaulting alien may be sanctioned only if she is found, and 
she is rarely found, enforcement is the exception rather than the rule.60  
One might envision a continuum with a variety of levels of 
enforcement. On one end of the continuum is the status quo; because those 
who breach usually elude deportation, the current default rule is non-
enforcement. 61  On the other end of the continuum is enforcement under a 
                                                           
58 See Alejandro Portes, Preface, in THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF 
IMMIGRATION: ESSAYS ON NETWORKS, ETHNICITY, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
(ALEJANDRO PORTES ed. 1995).   
59 See  Introduction in DAN KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007).  
60 For good reason, Manns refers to the typical undocumented alien as 
“judgment proof.”  Jeffrey Manns, supra note 17. 
61 Following the convention in the literature on the economic sociology of 
immigration, for practical purposes, I consider deportation to be synonymous with 
sanctioning. One might reasonably question this assumption: if a guest worker 
overstays his visa, and the host country deports him, why is this not simply an 
enforcement of a contractual obligation to which the guest worker agreed in the first 
place?  Indeed, there is a longstanding debate in immigration law regarding whether 
deportation should be viewed as a punishment at all. The question has obvious 
constitutional implications, given the constitutional protections that attach when 
crimes are punished. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) 
(holding that “an order of deportation is not a punishment for crime”); cf. Stephen H. 
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law, supra note 13 at 469  (arguing that 
theories of deportation overlap so substantially with those of criminal punishment 
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bonding system, under which full enforcement against a non-compliant alien 
involves both forfeiture of the bond and deportation. One might envision an 
“in between” system of partial enforcement, in which the bond is forfeited, 
but the government does not deport. A bonding system changes the default 
rule. Since the government can easily confiscate the bond proceeds even in 
the absence of deportation, the default rule is one of partial enforcement.  
This “half-way” option is arguably preferable to the status quo of non-
enforcement particularly if an applicant defaulting on a bond (and 
presumably on the loan) tarnishes her reputation with her home-country bank 
and neighbors.62  
Moreover, with institutional design innovations, one may 
substantially increase the likelihood of deportation and thus, full 
enforcement. For example, as discussed in Section III below, third-party 
bond-financiers may be motivated to find defaulting aliens and either report 
them to the authorities or convince them to self-deport by arranging for part 
of the bond to be given back to the alien, on the condition of her return 
home. While some may argue that self-deportation may not fulfill the 
“expressive” public function that we typically associate with conventional 
sanctions (that is, communicating the deportee’s bad behavior to the 
public),63 self-deportation nevertheless accomplishes the same practical 
purpose – excluding the alien from the United States.64 Moreover, such alien 
                                                                                                                                            
that deportation should at least sometimes be regarded as a form of punishment) and 
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts 
about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV., 1890-1935 (2000). 
62 Indeed, one might even argue that as long as the government retains the 
bond, the “half-way” default rule is a sanction unless an alien demonstrates 
compliance.    
63 While deportation is not technically considered punishment, it is clearly 
understood as a shame-inducing punishment by deportees, their families and the 
communities from which they originate. See also, KANSTROOM, supra note 64, at 
Introduction; Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of 
Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997) (articulating the importance of the 
“expressive” function of punishment); see also Tracey L. Meares, Social 
Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998) (same); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) 
(same).  
64 Tamar Jacoby, a prominent conservative thinker, has noted that the self-
deportation approach is virtuous in that it represents a middle ground in the 
immigration debate and bypasses the cumbersome federal bureaucracy. See WALL 
ST. J Opinion Archives, Is Cannon Fodder? One GOP Congressman May Lose His 
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exclusion would have been accomplished at a substantially lower cost than 
typically is incurred by the government under the current system.65 
Part II: INCENTIVITIZING FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
The Proposal in Broad Outline 
This section will discuss why unconventional mechanisms of 
enforcing loan agreements are essential to banks in developing countries. 
The proposed institutional innovations for visa-as-collateral are inspired by 
these insights.66  I begin by laying out the proposal in broad outline. 
                                                                                                                                            
Seat for His Pro-Immigration Views, While Another Offers a Compromise, 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/diary/?id=110008446 (last visited January 10, 
2010).  Blog postings indicate that some immigration law scholars and practitioners 
are skeptical. See, e.g., Posting of Frank Sharry to ImmigrationProf Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2008/07/ice-self-deport.html (July 30, 
2008) (expressing skepticism); Posting of Kevin Johnson to ImmigrationProf Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2008/08/government-ads.html (Aug. 
13, 2008) (same). 
65 See Jacoby, supra note 64. 
66  The proposal is not that the visa would constitute actual collateral, but 
rather that the visa would serve similar purposes for a secured lender that have 
traditionally been served by secured credit. However, there are clearly significant 
differences between a visa as a collateral-like device and traditional secured credit. I 
briefly mention a few obvious differences.  First, visas are not typically assignable.  
(For a discussion of how this might theoretically be done, the software model is 
useful, see, Ronald Mann Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 134, 151-53 (1999).) Thus, they would hardly constitute general intangibles in 
U.C.C. terms. (See American Law Institute 2005 discussion of U.C.C. § 9-106) 
Second, even if there were an assignable property right in a federally issued visa (as 
a license), there would undoubtedly be concerns regarding debt servitude.  See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
1373, 1386-87 (1997) (noting that there are ethical lines which limit security such as 
the prohibition on servitude). For a general discussion of the prohibition of debt 
servitude see, see Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured Credit: A Systems 
Approach 759-72 (2009).  For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the 
prohibition on debt servitude, see COLEMAN, supra note 24 at 41, 77, 138, 147 n.11, 
164-65, 218-19.  Third, there would be no actual foreclosure rights.  The notion of 
tying loan-compliance to visa-compliance (and vice versa) brings to mind cross-
default provisions that are common in private loan contracts.  While bankers 
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The U.S. government is the first gatekeeper. Assume that a visa 
officer in the local Embassy approves an applicant. The visa officer would 
issue the prospective visa-recipient with a provisional “visa license.”  This 
visa license would signify conditional approval for receiving a U.S. visa, 
contingent on a demonstrated ability to post a bond.   
The typical applicant would be unable to post a bond without a loan. 
The prospective visa-recipient would then present her conditional visa-
license to a bank in her country of origin as part of her loan application. In 
this proposal, the bank becomes the second gatekeeper. By providing only 
conditional approval for a visa, the U.S. government would be seeking an 
assurance from this second gatekeeper that the prospective visa-recipient has 
a good risk profile. 
Notably, the bank will be assessing the visa-applicant’s risk profile 
not only with respect to financial compliance. Although this would normally 
be the bank’s primary concern, for its own underwriting purposes the bank 
will also be obligated to assess the likelihood of visa-compliance. 
Recall that it is unlikely that the typical applicant will be able to 
service the large loan needed to post a bond, solely through employment in 
her country of origin given her poor earning potential. She will only be able 
to service the loan if she is able to work in the U.S. by remaining compliant 
with her visa. Thus, a consideration of the likelihood of visa-compliance is 
critical to the loan-underwriting process.  
In order to create incentives for banks to perform this gate-keeping 
function and finance the bond, the critical move is for the U.S. government 
to address the bank’s own difficulties in enforcing loan contracts. To this 
end, the U.S. government will tie visa compliance to loan compliance.   
The U.S. government would make two commitments to the 
prospective lender.  First, the U.S. government would agree not to renew the 
visa without being satisfied that the loan is in good standing.  Thus, in the 
                                                                                                                                            
typically insist in loan contracts that borrowers meet their regulatory obligations as a 
condition of the loan, a default in the other direction (i.e., regulators insisting that 
borrowers mean their loan obligations) is unusual, and unsurprisingly, I have not 
been able to find a discussion of such practices (or even proposals) in the literature.  
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event of a default, the bank can be secure in the knowledge that there is an 
implicit penalty, namely non-renewal of a visa.   
Second, if the applicant does not comply with her visa terms, thus 
risking default on the bond, the bank should still be able to recoup some 
significant portion of the bond if it is able to provide evidence to the U.S. 
government that the defaulting visa-recipient has self-deported within some 
reasonable time-period. The proportion of the bond recouped should be 
indexed to the speed of self-deportation. This will provide an incentive for 
banks to perform a critical function that public enforcers traditionally have 
found difficult, namely, the expeditious exclusion of visa-overstayers from 
the United States.   
Of course banks could always “snitch” on a non-compliant alien to 
the public enforcers. However, this proposal’s emphasis is on self-
deportation because it achieves the same goal without public intervention.  
Thus, banks should receive a greater proportion of the bond if deportation is 
accomplished at a lower cost without the intervention of the authorities. 
A. Interviews with Jamaican Guest Workers and Lenders 
The author conducted qualitative field work as a supplement to the 
theoretical arguments in order to aid in assessment of the importance and 
practical feasibility of the proposal. These consisted of focus groups with 
Jamaican subsistence farmers who have traveled to North America as 
agricultural guest workers.67 The findings are summarized as follows.   
Although interviewees discussed a range of options, the bottom line 
was that the subjects currently have few options to finance big-ticket items, 
such as visa expenses. When they do finance such expenses, they are likely 
to rely on family or informal financial intermediaries. There was a notable 
                                                           
67  In other areas of legal scholarship, ethnographic research or qualitative field 
work has shed light on interdisciplinary analyses of compliance, both in contract law 
and in the criminal law.  For an article that is a paradigmatic example of qualitative 
field work in the area of contract law and secured transactions, see Ronald Mann, 
Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134, 151-53 (1999) 
(conducting a qualitative field study of software companies and their bankers). For 
an article that summarizes the influence of ethnographic work on compliance in the 
context of criminal law, see Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology:  The 
New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997). See also Tracey L. Meares, 
Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998) 
(same),Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner 
City, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 809–13 (1998) (same). 
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bifurcation in their attitudes towards formal financial intermediates. While 
they generally had skeptical attitudes to formal financial intermediaries 
because of perceived hostile lending practices, they simultaneously believed 
that they had a better chance of obtaining loans than their similarly situated 
non-migrant peers, because of their healthy revenue streams while working 
overseas in the form of remittances.  
The author then conducted interviews with formal financial 
intermediaries to assess whether their experience of providing financial 
services to poor rural Jamaicans coincided with the views of the focus group 
participants. Most financial intermediaries conceded that they usually 
insisted on collateral for loans, a practice which excluded most prospective 
migrant clients. While the banks rarely expected to recoup value in the event 
of a loan default, the primary rationale offered for an insistence on collateral 
was that it allowed them to issue strategic threats to potential defaulters. 
However, the banking interviewees had significant concerns regarding 
enforcement of loan terms.  Bankers believed that it would be difficult to 
secure re-possession of collateral by state actors, even if they received 
favorable judgments in Jamaican courts.   
The proposed institutional innovations of visa-as-collateral discussed 
in the ensuing section (IV) are influenced by the interview findings.  
B. Methodology 
The study was not meant to be a detailed study of financial 
intermediation, for which the “gold standard” of economic ethnographic 
work is a review of diaries in which subjects keep precise records of their 
financial transactions.68 The research design was entirely qualitative and the 
study methodology was multi-method in focus. 69  This is a difficult-to-reach 
population and partly for this reason, the study was not randomized. Utilizing 
referrals from previous work in this population, I developed a snowball 
sample, a method which is often used in qualitative field work for subjects 
with similar characteristics.  The typical subject was a resident of a rural 
Jamaican community, who had previously been a guest worker visa and 
                                                           
68  See, e.g., RUTHERFORD, supra note 53; See also COLLINS, supra note 24.  
69 I acknowledge the work of Mr. Densil Reid, who has significant experience 
in fieldwork in rural agricultural populations.  
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expressed an interest in working in North America again.70 All interviews 
and interview notes are on file with the author.71  
C.   Summary of Focus Group Findings 
The author explained the bonding proposal to the focus-group 
participants. Although the author did not provide an estimate of the average 
value of a deterrent bond, focus group participants understood that it would 
be significant since the average Jamaican agricultural worker quadruples his 
family’s earnings as a guest worker in North America.72  
 Most respondents described themselves as being “well-off” in 
relation to their similarly situated non-migrant neighbors, due largely to their 
overseas earnings. Most emphasized that prior to their initial receipt of a 
                                                           
70 Although tourism workers are now eligible to access the U.S. as guest 
workers, in the Jamaican context, these persons are not understood to be low-skilled 
since they have received some formal training in trade schools, and complete tests to 
gain certifications. As such, I restricted the sample to persons who are understood in 
the Jamaican context to be “low-skilled,” namely agricultural workers. Their access 
to overseas labor markets is the most restricted, since they are considered high risks 
for immigration infractions.  They typically lack formal training, are low-income and 
are poorly situated to provide the evidence of formal ties in Jamaica (including hard 
assets such as land) that are typically required to demonstrate their suitability for 
visas.  For a description of the snowball sampling technique as it has been applied in 
studies of low-skilled migrants, see Wayne Cornelius, Interviewing Undocumented 
Immigrants: Methodological Reflections Based on Fieldwork in Mexico and the 
United States, 16 INT’L MIGRATION REV., 378-411 (1982). 
71 In keeping with practice in such studies to maintain the privacy of 
interviewees in these small closely knit communities, they are identified by their 
initials. They include DR1, MK, DR2, AB, WM, LM, FC, CL, BR, EC, JH, DD, 
DO, MS, DM, LM, DD and DP.  
72 This estimate is based on a survey of funds remitted by guest workers 
conducted by the Remittance Research Group in the Department of Economics at the 
University of the West Indies. Notably, it was not possible based on the available 
research to segregate the earnings of American guest workers (as opposed to 
Canadian guest workers). See also Survey of Living Conditions, published by Sir 
Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of the West 
Indies and the Planning Institute of Jamaica. The most recent online data set is for 
2007. http://salises.mona.uwi.edu/databank/slc2007/survey0/index.html  Jamaicans 
who are able to travel to the United States to work experience a substantial “place 
premium,” namely the wage gain accruing to foreign workers who arrive in the U.S. 
The average 35 year old Jamaican in the U.S. with 9 years of education earns 3.63 
times what he would earn in Jamaica. See Clemens et al, supra note 19.  
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guest worker visa, they had found it difficult to raise funds for migration 
related-costs, such as passport and visa fees. Given the difficulty in raising 
funds for these relatively modest costs, interview subjects felt sure that the 
cost of a bond would be prohibitive for those who did not have access to a 
loan.  
Focus group participants also indicated that they might have access to 
financing through other sources; notably, these sources were all informal. 
The predominant mechanism of financial intermediation appeared to be 
informal savings clubs or “partners,” the indigenous parlance for Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs),73 organized by church groups, 
community clubs and farming associations.74 Respondents’ attitudes towards 
formal financial institutions demonstrated an interesting bifurcation. They 
seemed aware of one lending program offered by a prominent local financial 
institution, which was specifically targeted at migrants who were regular 
remitters (that is, migrants who sent funds regularly back to Jamaica while 
working overseas). 75 However, although they were aware of this program in 
the abstract, they appeared overwhelmingly skeptical that they would be able 
to borrow from any formal financial institutions. Even though only one 
respondent had ever approached a formal financial institution for a loan, they 
repeatedly stated that the institutions’ lending policies were not conducive to 
rural farmers since most did not have collateral other than their farms which 
                                                           
73 Timothy Besley et al., The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations, in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (DILIP 
MOOKHERJEE & DEBRAJ RAY eds., 2001) at 792-93, describe ROSCAS as follows: 
“members commit to putting a fixed sum of money into a "pot" for each period of 
the life of the ROSCA. Lots are drawn, and the pot is randomly allocated to one of 
the members. In the next period, the process repeats itself, except that the previous 
winner is excluded from the draw for the pot. The process continues, with every past 
winner excluded, until each member of the ROSCA has received the pot once. At 
this point, the ROSCA is either disbanded or begins over again.”  
74 Indeed, respondents appeared to be involved in other risk-pooling 
arrangements, such as informal agricultural insurance arrangements. For example, 
farmer A commits to sharing his crop with farmer B if a catastrophic event such as a 
fire occurs and vice versa.  For a good summary of some of the research in this area, 
see Abigail Barr, Marleen Dekker & Marcel Fafchamps, Risk Sharing Relations and 
Enforcement Mechanisms (Ctr. for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper 
No. 2008–14, 2008), available at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/wps-
list.html.   
75 This institution is Jamaica National. 
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many seemed unwilling to put at risk.76 Nevertheless, they expressed the 
view that, theoretically, they should be in a better position than their peers to 
access loan financing given that they already had superior access to informal 
financial intermediation (in the form of ROSCAs) and they were known in 
their communities for their overseas earnings. 77  
D.  How Migrants Currently Finance their Relocation Costs 
The economic ethnography literature demonstrates that virtually all 
financial intermediation services currently utilized by the poor exist in the 
                                                           
76 Indeed, Field et al. and Galiani et al. have found a similar unwillingness to 
put homes at risk to access loans among the urban poor in several Latin American 
cities. Sebastian Galiani and Ernesto Schargrodsky, Property Rights for the Poor: 
Effects of Land Titling, Centro de Investigacion en Finanzas at 26 (Working Paper, 
Aug. 9, 2005), available at http://www.utdt.edu/Upload/CIF_wp/wpcif-062005.pdf; 
Erica Field and Maximo Torero, Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among 
Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program at abstract (Working 
Paper, Jan. 2004) at 5, available at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/field/files/FieldTorerocs.pdf. 
The difficulty that farmers experience in accessing credit in developing 
countries is supported by other research. Indeed, this appears to be a primary 
motivator for migration. In the 1990s, there was a sudden surge of Pakistani farmers 
traveling overseas as guest workers. Economists found that lack of access to credit 
was the major factor accounting for the upsurge. Pakistani farmers seeking to take 
advantage of the Green Revolution found themselves unable to buy expensive 
fertilizers. A primary rationale for migration was either to generate funds for their 
own farms or to generate excess cash to make loans to other farmers. Thus, 
migration emerged as an innovative credit mechanism to deal “a vacuum in . . . rural 
credit facilities.” Interestingly, the rate of migration was highest among members of 
the land-owning castes that had title to their land, but were generally unable to 
access credit at home. Having migrated, they were then better able to access credit 
than their non-migrant peers. Alain Lefebvre “International Labor Migration from 
Two Pakistani Villages with Different Forms of Agriculture,” Pakistan Development 
Review, 29: 1-20 (1990) in MASSEY ET AL (EDS.), WORLDS IN MOTION: 
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 
(2005). A similar study of migration patterns of Egyptian guest workers who had 
previously been farmers found similar results. The primary rationale for migration 
appeared the inability to access credit at home to upgrade their farms. Richard H. 
Adams, Worker Remittances and Inequality in Rural Egypt, 38 ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 45-71 (1989). 
77 Manuel Orozco, Remittances in Latin America and the Caribbean: Their 
Impact on Local Economies and the Response of Local Governments in the 
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES TO THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE BY 
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (Oct. 2008) at 35.  
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informal economy78 and the same is true for poor migrants.   Typically poor 
migrants are unable to obtain visas and must locate a “coyote,” namely, an 
underground broker 79 who is willing to transport them through clandestine 
cross-border networks and then seek financing for coyote fees. 80 Coyote fees 
are typically prohibitive for the average migrant.81 Migrants who already 
have social networks in the United States can take low-interest loans from 
their friends or family or from informal savings clubs, which are generally 
sustained by remittances from relatives overseas; this appears to be a popular 
method of financing.82 If these sources are unavailable, migrants typically 
seek to obtain financing from a local money-lender, where interest rates 
appear to be extremely high (studies estimate these on an annualized basis as 
ranging from 50% to 120% depending on the particulars of the local 
market).83   
Migrants also have another option: they may obtain financing from a 
coyote. The implicit interest rates charged by coyotes appear to be 
                                                           
78 RUTHERFORD, supra note 53, at 32. 
79          The sociologist, David Spener has conducted ethnographic research on how 
Mexican migrants finances, which includes informal work on coyote transportation. 
For a representative publication that includes some of this work see, David Spener, 
Self-Employment Concentration and Earnings Among Mexican Immigrants in the 
U.S., 77 SOCIAL FORCES, (Mar. 1999). There is preliminary evidence that these 
coyote networks have been taken over by transnational drug gangs, which are cash-
rich and able to provide loans to finance transportation and to penalize defaulters. 
Joel Millman, Immigrants Become Hostages as Gangs Prey on Mexicans, WALL ST. 
J., June 10, 2009 at A1.  
80  For example, the average coyote fee from Mexico is US$2500, which is 
more than one third of the average per-capita income of a rural Mexican national. 
Although the per-capita GNI of Mexico is approximately US$7600, rural Mexicans 
are considerably poorer. World Bank, Mexico at a Glance, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/mex_aag.pdf.  
81 The equivalent figure from Guatemala is roughly US$10,000 -- which is 
nearly three times the average per capita income of a Guatemalan and from El 
Salvador the figure is in excess of US$10,000, which is more than three times the 
average per-capita income. Interview with Spener, World Bank, Gross National 
Income Per Capita, Atlas Method and PPP, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. 
Miriam Jordan, Latest Immigration Wave: Retreat, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 2, 2008) 
(finding that Guatemalan migrant paid $5,700 in initial coyote fees, but after interest 
amount totaled $10,000). 
82 Jordan, supra note 81. 
83 Id.  
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exorbitant, exceeding even the very high rates of local money-lenders.84    
The willingness of coyotes to extend credit appears to depend on a number of 
factors beyond the perceived default-risk of the client, including the coyote’s 
capability to enforce informal “loan contracts” if a borrower defaults, their 
historical tenure in the coyote business and their overhead costs. 85  There is 
evidence that even under conditions where border passage is not clandestine, 
these conditions may still persist.  For example, although migration from 
South Asia to the Gulf is almost entirely documented (i.e. migrants have 
valid visas), money lenders and labor brokers appear to enforce loan 
contracts for migration expenses with explicit and implicit threats of 
violence.  
E.   The Background Legal Context 
For my friends, anything; for my enemies, the law. 
 Oscar R. Benavides, Former President of Peru86 
Lenders confirmed the views of migrant respondents that there are 
few formal financial services available to them. Notably, these lenders 
typically insisted on collateral. Among those that engage in non-collateral 
based (i.e. unsecured) lending, most engage in micro-lending.  
Lenders cited as a primary factor in firms’ reluctance to lend to the 
poor was the pervasive uncertainty regarding the likelihood of enforcement 
of loan contracts, and repossession of collateral. Specifically, the 
interviewees’ concerns centered on six different possibilities:  
 
1) Firms were concerned that the de jure policy surrounding loan 
contracts may change; 
 
2) Firms were concerned that the de jure rules surrounding the 
repossession of collateral may change; 
                                                           
84 Id.  
85 Interview with Spener.  Notably, the coyote’s capability to enforce loan 
contracts appears to be high, particularly if they operate as subsidiaries of illegal 
narcotics gang networks. Josh Meyer, Drug Cartels Raise the Stakes on Human 
Smuggling, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009; see also Hussein Sadruddin, Natalia Walter 
& Jose Hidalgo, Human Trafficking in the United States: Expanding Victim 
Protection Beyond Prosecution Witnesses, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 379, 382-84 
(2005).  
86 I am grateful to Lant Pritchett for pointing out this quotation to me. 
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3) Even if the de jure rules surrounding loan contracts did not 
change, there could be a gap between de jure rules and judicial 
application of these rules to the facts of their case;  
 
4) Even if the de jure rules surrounding repossession of collateral 
did not change, there could be a gap between de jure rules and 
judicial application of these rules to the facts of their case; 
 
5) Even if the courts ruled in their favor with respect to loan 
contracts, there could be a gap between the courts’ judgments 
and the de facto implementation of these judgments by state 
actors; and,  
 
6) Even if the courts ruled in their favor with respect to 
repossession of collateral, there could be a gap between courts’ 
judgments and the de facto implementation of these judgments 
by state actors.  
 
The last two factors were of particular concern. Lenders expressed more 
confidence in the legal rules and the judiciary responsible for their 
administration than they did in the likelihood that state actors would enforce 
favorable rulings. Notably, the interviewees articulated two independent 
stains of concerns regarding institutional quality. First, there is a concern 
regarding the institutional quality of the judicial branch (i.e. the judicial 
application of rules to the facts of a particular case) not because of perceived 
corruption but because the judicial branch is poorly resourced, resulting in 
long delays in rulings.  Second there is a concern regarding the institutional 
quality of the state actors responsible for implementing the courts’ judgments 
into credible enforcement actions. This finding demonstrates that weak 
judicial systems undermine the likelihood that financial intermediaries will 
rely on a de jure rule being translated into a judicial decision, and in turn, 
weak state actors undermine the likelihood that financial intermediaries will 
rely on de facto implementation of judicial decisions. Given this legal 
context, in the event that bankers do lend, such lending is unlikely to be 
subject to broad-based and equally applied rules. On the contrary, lending is 
more likely to be based on deals, namely, highly specific accommodations 
for individual borrowers or groups of borrowers.  
 
F.     The Four Principles Underlying the Extension of Credit to the Poor 
Against a background of pervasive informality and legal uncertainty, 
Jamaican banks offered rationales for their lending practices that seem 
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somewhat unconventional in light of traditional theories of lending in the 
legal scholarship.  Four principles appear to undergird lending to the poor. 
First, banks may forego collateral-based lending altogether if they have a 
relationship with or share a community with the borrower and thus have 
ample information about him or her. Second, when they forego collateral-
based lending, they structure contracts that enable them to extract a penalty 
from the borrower even if they are unable to recoup their funds. Third, such 
penalties are often extracted in a manner that minimizes the need for 
enforcement by a poorly developed, unreliable and inaccessible legal system.  
Finally, in a context of pervasive legal uncertainty, collateral is still valuable, 
and where it is available, banks may accept collateral not primarily for its 
liquidation value, but rather for the ability that it provides banks to 
strategically threaten the borrower with seizure in order to motivate her 
repayment. 
1. The Difficulties Surrounding Collateral May Lead Banks to Forego 
Collateral or Enforcement of Their Repossession Rights 
Even if poor households have available collateral, banks may still be 
wary of accepting such collateral, and even if they accept it, they may 
forego enforcement of their repossession rights in the event of a default.87 
This finding is surprising, particularly against the background of a plethora 
of scholarship in both law and economics arguing that one strategy to 
mitigate credit rationing is to enable asset-building so that the poor are able 
to offer collateral.88   Yet, the empirical evidence regarding this particular 
                                                           
87  This finding is also supported by Galiani et al, supra note 76; Field et al, 
supra note 76. 
88 Hernando De Soto’s work advocacy of titling programs among the third 
world poor is the most well-known example of this approach. HERNANDO DE SOTO, 
THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM (1989); HERNANDO DE 
SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITALISM: WHY CAPITALISM TRUMPS IN THE WEST, AND 
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). See also, Introduction to ROBERT COOTER AND 
HANS-BERND SCHAEFER, LAW AND POVERTY OF NATIONS, (Jan. 10, 2010) 
(unpublished book manuscript, on file at 
http://works.bepress.com/robert_cooter/144); Michael J. Trebilcock & Paul-Erik 
Veel, Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2008); Paul G. Mahoney The Common Law and Economic 
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001); Richard A. Posner, 
Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, The World Bank Research 
Observer, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1998), but see Introduction to MARK GOODALE AND 
SALLY E. MERRY, THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE 
39 
claim is decidedly mixed and suggests that the skepticism of collateral-
based lending that I found among Jamaican banks may be widespread in the 
developing world.89  My interviews in Jamaica suggested that the 
fundamental challenge is as follows: just as important as recognizing an 
owner’s possession (and the repossession rights of a secured creditor in the 
event of a default) is the existence of a reliable legal system to which a bank 
can turn to enforce a loan contract and its repossession rights. 90 
2. Bank Structure Contracts That Enable Them to Extract a Penalty From 
the Borrower, Without Resorting to the Formal Legal System  
When these bankers typically lend to the migrant poor, they are most 
likely to pursue micro-credit programs. Micro-credit often has been 
described as the only advance in lending that has succeeded in expanding the 
availability of credit for the very poor on a macro-level.  The primary 
innovation of micro-credit programs is group-lending: individuals without 
access to collateral form groups with the goal of obtaining a loan.  While 
loans are made individually to members of the group, all of the members of 
the group will be denied access to future borrowing if any individual 
borrower fails to repay.91 It is this innovation that appears to account for the 
consistently high repayment rates.  
In accordance with the literature, some banker-interviewees stressed 
the existence of social collateral as a substitute for physical collateral, since 
those who are at risk of defaulting on their loans suffer significant peer 
pressure and may even be stigmatized in the larger community in the long-
term if they eventually default. However, all of the banker-interviewees 
emphasized that in the event of a default they had minimal expectation of 
                                                                                                                                            
GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL (2007) (expressing doubts about the faith other scholars 
have placed in asset building as a strategy for poverty alleviation).  
89 Galiani et al., supra note 76; Field et al., supra note 76. 
90 I do not mean to single out the importance of legal rules and a reliable legal 
system as the most important reason for banks’ reluctance to lend to the titled poor; 
there are a variety of other rationales that might be offered for pervasive failures in 
credit markets for the poor.  For a comprehensive survey of the literature, see Robert 
Cull et al., Financial Outreach and Performance: A Global Analysis of Leading 
Microbanks 117 Economic Journal 107 (2007). 
91   Notably, in most micro-lending programs, there is no formal or legal joint 
liability, i.e., group members are not legally obligated to repay the pro rata portion of 
a defaulting member.  See ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION, et al., THE ECONOMICS OF 
MICROFINANCE, Ch. 3 (2005).  
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repayment. What appeared attractive to these interviewees about micro-credit 
was that peer monitoring provides a penalty that is sure and swift, and that 
does not require dependence on a legal system that may be unreliable or 
inaccessible. 
3.  Synergies with Relational Theories of Financing 
There is an extensive discussion in the legal scholarship of the 
motivations of lenders and borrowers when considering whether to engage in 
secured financing. Conventionally, collateral serves the function of reducing 
the likelihood that borrowers will default in circumstances where they can 
easily divert cash flows without the knowledge of the lender.92  There is 
virtually nothing in the legal scholarship as to how these conventional 
theories of secured lending may apply to financing under conditions of 
pervasive informality.  However, this is a central theme in the development 
finance literature, which converges with the legal scholarship on secured 
lending in significant respects.93  While the development finance literature 
discusses several potential considerations that might affect institutional 
lender behavior in this context, the key issue that is repeatedly emphasized is 
the divertibility of cash flows.94 In conditions of informality, cash diversion 
is more likely to occur and more difficult to detect.  In response to these 
challenges, traditional financial institutions have generally required 
collateral.95     
 
While the traditional view has been that lenders value the right of 
liquidation in a secured transaction, this theory is less plausible under these 
circumstances.  The aforementioned legal challenges present a de facto, if 
not de jure, bar to a lender’s ability to liquidate collateral.  In this context, 
liquidation rights are moot. Yet banks often insist on collateral as a condition 
of lending to the poor. The question becomes: Why require collateral from 
these borrowers? Of the rationales offered in the literature, those that fall 
under the umbrella of indirect “relational” rationales seem most applicable.96  
Relational theories are skeptical of the notion that lenders pursue secured 
                                                           
92  Id. at 21. 
93  A good summary is included in Bond and Rai, supra note 30.   
94  The Introduction to ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION et al., supra note 91, 
provides an excellent summary of this literature. 
95  Id.  
96  To the extent that these theories focus disproportionately on secured 
financing, I mean to emphasize not the security, but rather the relational aspects of 
the theories. 
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transactions because of direct enforcement effects such as liquidation rights. 
Rather, these theories emphasize that security has important indirect effects 
on the borrower’s behavior and incentives prior to the point of default.97  
Notably, several banker-interviewees emphasized that they value 
collateral because of the power that it allows them to wield before the 
possibility of default even arises. Specifically, they are able to curtail 
excesses of the borrower through strategic threats against the collateral.  
Apparently, these threats are credible even if the collateral is only notional 
because of the role that threats play in sending signals to the larger 
community regarding the health of a debtor’s finances. In this manner, 
strategic threat-making falls squarely into a “signaling” theory of secured 
lending.98  
It seems particularly applicable in the conditions of informality 
which characterize the bottom of the pyramid. Typically, the poor depend 
heavily on their communities. This is not coincidental for in resource-
constrained circumstances, neighbors are indispensable to risk pooling 
arrangements; the poor are likely to depend on their neighbors for a range of 
risk-pooling arrangements from informal agricultural insurance to communal 
herding grounds to savings clubs. For obvious reasons, a person’s fate is 
heavily intertwined with that of her neighbors.99 In such close-knit 
communities, it is difficult for a borrower to keep private his difficulties with 
                                                           
97  See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 
VA. L. REV. 2179, 2188-89 (1994) (citing the creditor's "power to punish the 
debtor"); David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1635, 1679-80 (1998) (citing the importance of "[p]ower [as opposed to 
monitoring] "); Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business 
Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-26 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Small-Business Secured 
Credit] (arguing that for lenders to small businesses, the ability to prevent borrowers 
from taking on future debt is a primary motivator for securing the debt); Ronald J. 
Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2244-
47 (1999) [hereinafter Mann, Verification Institutions] (same); Alan Schwartz, 
Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1396, 1412-14 
(1997) (arguing that firms issue secured debt to avert dilution of their claims by later 
lenders); Scott, supra note 47, at 927-29 (1986) (suggesting that collateral has 
"hostage-like” characteristics); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions 
of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 245-47 (1992) (discussing the 
bank’s leverage with the lender as an important factor). 
98  Triantis, supra note 97. While Triantis does not use the phrase in this 
context, it seems particularly applicable. 
99  See generally, Barr et al., supra note 74, at 25. (Abigail Barr, et al.) 
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his bankers. Rural Jamaican farmers are like the famous Ellicksonian 
ranchers;100 “gossip” appears to play an important role in mediating business 
relations. A bank’s threat to enforce a loan agreement provides a signal to 
neighbors that the borrower is experiencing financial difficulty.101  
G.    Visas as New “New Property”102 
Visa-as-collateral has been designed with the foregoing emphasis on 
unconventional enforcement mechanisms in mind.  The important conceptual 
shift is a re-conceptualization of a visa as a license, a quasi-property right 
with collateral-like characteristics.  Why conceptualize a visa in this manner? 
1.  The Reich Analogy and a Visa as a Franchise or a License 
In a seminal article forty years ago, Reich noted that an increasing 
number of persons derived their wealth from their relationships with the 
federal government.  He identified a range of benefits which derived from 
government largesse and famously named them “the new property.103     
                                                           
100  ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991). 
101  As Scott has so aptly put it, “in essence, relational security signals (to) 
other creditors that a policeman is walking the beat, and thus they can relax their 
vigilance in taking individual precautions.”  Scott, supra note 49, at 14.  
102  The term is Blocher’s play on Reich’s term. See Blocher, supra note 35.  
103  Like Reich, I utilize the term “property” not in the traditional Blackstonian 
sense that generations of lawyers now associate with alienablity and “despotic” 
ownership, inter alia, but rather, as the word “property” is utilized in a modern sense 
to refer to a more abstract and complicated network of legal entitlements and 
obligations which serve not only narrow private goals, but also promote larger public 
goals.  The proposal is not that the visa would constitute actual collateral, but rather 
that the visa would serve similar purposes for a secured lender that have traditionally 
been served by secured credit. However, there are clearly significant differences 
between a visa as a collateral-like device and traditional secured credit. I briefly 
mention a few obvious differences.  First, even if the federal government were to 
create property rights in visas, visas are not typically assignable.  (For a discussion 
of how this might theoretically be done, the software model is useful, see, Ronald 
Mann Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134, 151-53 
(1999).)  Thus, they would hardly constitute general intangibles in UCC terms. (See 
American Law Institute 2005 discussion of U.C.C. § 9-106) Second, even if there 
were an assignable property right in a federally issued visa (as a license), there 
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Specifically, Reich noted that public law entitlements were 
increasingly fulfilling goals that had traditionally been associated with 
private law and a market economy, for example, providing millions of 
Americans with their primary source of income.  Visas, in fact, share several 
“new property” characteristics. For example, like welfare benefits although 
visas were initially conceived as easily revocable privileges, they have since 
evolved into instruments with property-like characteristics, which in many 
instances are only revocable if the visa-recipient is provided with some due 
process.  Like other forms of “new property,” visas provide for their holders 
a certain legal status bestowed by government, through which they can 
access a particular set of economic benefits.  While it is true that visas do not 
share traditional characteristics of property as it conventionally has been 
understood (for example, visas typically may not be bought or sold and are 
generally understood to be categorically excluded from the market), in this 
manner, visas are no different from other forms of “new property” such as 
government-backed entitlements (e.g., welfare benefits) that are inalienable 
but nevertheless widely recognized to have property-like characteristics. 
Consider further a visa’s analogy to a franchise or a license, both 
prototypical examples of “new property.”  Although a visa would not 
typically be thought of as either a franchise or a license, in fact, a visa is 
deeply analogous to both.  Indeed, U.S. visas may be described as licenses to 
                                                                                                                                            
would undoubtedly be concerns regarding debt servitude.  See, e.g., Elizabeth 
Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information, 82 Cornell L. Rev 1373, 1386-
87 (1997) (noting that there are ethical lines which limit security such as the 
prohibition on servitude).  For a general discussion of the prohibition of debt 
servitude see, see Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured Credit: A Systems 
Approach 759-72 (2009).  For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the 
prohibition on debt servitude, see Peter J. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in 
America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607-1900, at 41, 77, 
138, 147 n.11, 164-65, 218-19 (1974).  Third, there would be no actual foreclosure 
rights.  The notion of tying loan-compliance to visa-compliance (and vice versa) 
brings to mind cross-default provisions that are common in private loan contracts. 
While bankers typically insist in loan contracts that borrowers meet their regulatory 
obligations as a condition of the loan, a default in the other direction (i.e., regulators 
insisting that borrowers mean their loan obligations) is unusual, and unsurprisingly, I 
have not been able to find a discussion of such practices (or even proposals) in the 
literature.  
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work in the United States.  Like licenses, visas make it possible for their 
recipients to engage in particular kinds of work.  Like other forms of 
licensees, visa-holders are only able to receive what is usually their primary 
source of income because they hold visas. Thus, the “new property” analogy 
fits.   
Further, like franchises, particular types of visas may be 
conceptualized as partial monopolies.  Indeed, some economists have pointed 
out that visas bear strong analogies to partial monopolies in other arenas.104  
In part by limiting their number, the government has made U.S. visas 
extremely remunerative for the lucky few who receive them.105 It is difficult 
to dispute that visas create huge financial windfalls for recipients.106    
2.  A Visa’s Other Property-Like Characteristics: Reputation  
Visas display another property-like characteristic as well.  Recent 
scholarship has contended that “reputation itself – social status and the 
respect of others – can usefully be understood as a form of property.”107                       
Sociological studies demonstrate that visas confer reputational benefits on 
visa recipients that they are able to monetize in myriad ways while they are 
in the United States.108 Moreover, these reputational benefits extend to their 
                                                           
104  Indeed the partial monopoly argument has been used to buttress the 
distributive justice concern, namely the view that requiring visas to work makes it 
costlier for poor people to fill jobs which they desperately needed and which have 
few natural barriers to entry.   
105  This is particularly the case with respect to highly-skilled visas, which are 
usually limited in number and whose holders usually command substantial 
compensation in the marketplace. See Gates Tells Congress What is Needed for 
Better Work Force, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2008 (discussing testimony of Bill Gates 
on highly skilled visas). 
106  The franchise-like characteristics are clearly more applicable to particular 
categories of visas.  For example, if visa-recipients are competing with a large pool 
of undocumented persons once they arrive in the United States, the franchise-like 
characteristics of the visa are clearly less applicable. 
107  See generally Blocher, supra note 35. The term “reputational property” 
generally has been utilized with respect to intellectual property such as goodwill.  
However, unlike reputational property without clear economic value (such as 
reputational property in the virtual world of social networking sites), the reputational 
benefits conferred by visas are monetized in concrete ways. 
108  Sociological studies demonstrate that because visa recipients from certain 
communities have historically done well in the United States, they have built 
reputational capital from which future visa recipients also benefit.  For example, 
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families in their countries and communities of origin, where they also are 
monetized.  
Reputations, and the corresponding ability to monetize them, may be 
augmented or diminished depending on whether aliens maintain their visas 
and remain providers for their families and communities of origin.  While 
there is little doubt that simply by virtue of the countries and communities 
from which they originate109 migrants remain subject to extreme credit 
rationing, 110 the interviews of Jamaican migrant workers and professional 
lenders support other studies indicating that visas confer reputational benefits 
                                                                                                                                            
Cuban migrants generally are understood in the Miami business community to be 
good credit risks. Even when they lack start-up capital, their perceived solid 
reputations have allowed them to enter certain forms of business in the U.S. for 
which there typically have been high barriers to entry for native-born Americans.  
See Alejandro Portes, The Social Origins of the Cuban Enclave Economy of Miami, 
30 SOCIO. PERSP. 340, 363 (1987); Robert W. Fairlie and Bruce D. Meyer, Ethnic 
and Racial Self-Employment Differences and Possible Explanations, 31 J. OF HUM. 
RESOURCES 757-93 (1996); Alejandro Portes and Leif Jensen, The Enclave and the 
Entrants: Patterns of Ethnic Enterprise in Miami Before and After Mariel, 54 AM. 
SOCIO. REV. 929-49 (1989).  
109 As economists have sought to explain why firms in developing countries do 
not always avail themselves of the best opportunities that are available, a primary 
contributing factor appears to be credit constraints. For a good summary of this 
literature, see Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Reputation Effects and the Limits 
of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry, 115 Q. J. OF ECO. 989  
(2000);  Oded Galor and Joseph Zeira, Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, 
60  REV. OF ECO. STUD. 35 (1993).  
110  This evidence comes from Bolivia, Mexico and the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.  For a brief background summary of the literature on credit-rationing 
among the poor in developing countries, see Niloy Bose & Richard Cothren, 
Asymmetric Information and Loan Contracts in a Neoclassical Growth Model, 29 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 423, 429-30 (1997) (observing that investors, 
particularly in developing countries, face the prospect of credit-rationing, and a 
favored group of firms typically enjoys access to the credit market at very low cost, 
while others must rely exclusively on internally generated funds.)  A good summary 
is included in the Introduction to the 1989 World Bank Annual report. World Bank, 
Financial Systems and Development (1989).  Two other works that provide excellent 
summaries are BASU KAUSHIK, THE LESS DEVELOPED ECONOMY: A CRITIQUE OF 
CONTEMPORARY THEORY (1984); James R. Tybout, Credit Rationing and Investment 
Behavior in a Developing Country, 65 Review of Economics and Statistics, 598-607 
(1983). 
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that allow some recipients to obtain credit that normally would not be 
available to them.111  
To the extent that poor migrants are more likely to receive credit 
than their similarly situated neighbors without visas, the interviews indicate a 
continuum of rationales that might be offered for this result.  Notable among 
these rationales is that bank lending is derivative of the reputational benefits 
associated with visas.  Banks appear more willing to extend credit if some 
external entity has vetted the prospective borrower.  A U.S. visa would 
constitute a signal that a reliable authority has vetted its recipient.  In this 
manner, a visa may fulfill the role of more conventional due diligence,112 
such as credit reports, which are typically unavailable in developing 
countries. Moreover, migrant-borrowers already are likely to be high-status 
persons within their communities who would suffer some reputational loss in 
the event of a default. 113  
 
 
 
                                                           
111  The discussion in footnote supra, note 76, concerning improved credit 
access for Pakistani and Egyptian migrant farmers supports this conclusion.  
112 Indeed, one scholar argues that by effectively constraining 
defaults, the credit reporting system actually has created collateral. 
See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Human Worth As Collateral, 38 RUTGERS 
L. J. 793 (2007). 
113  My interviews with loan officers in the formal Jamaican banking sector 
who service the poor supported these views.  I identified a few banks which extend 
credit to migrants to fund costs associated with the regularization or extension of 
their immigration status in the United States.  For example, two leading financial 
institutions in the Caribbean and Central America have large-scale programs to 
extend loans to migrants for the application and legal costs associated with extending 
their “Temporary Protected Status.” (TPS) These financial institutions are Jamaica 
National Building Society (“JN”), which services Caribbean nationals and Banco 
Pichincha, which services Central American nationals and particularly Ecuadorians. 
The Secretary of Homeland Security may designate the nationals of a foreign 
country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the 
country's nationals from returning safely.  Following the recent earthquake, 
undocumented Haitian nationals received TPS.  See 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d
1a/?vgnextoid=848f7f2ef0745210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel
=848f7f2ef0745210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited June 10, 2010) 
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Part III. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN BENEFITS 
A. Is This Proposal Politically Plausible? 
An observer reasonably might question the political plausibility of visa-
as-collateral on the grounds that the U.S. government would essentially be 
conditioning visa renewal not on a breach of U.S. law -- or even a breach of 
foreign law -- but on compliance with private loan contracts in a foreign 
jurisdiction to which the U.S. is not a party.114  This skepticism is reasonable 
since in matters of immigration, distributive justice concerns historically 
have not been a major concern for Congress.115 Rather, when making 
immigration law, Congress traditionally has been motivated by labor needs 
and economic concerns, and more recently, it appears to be motivated 
increasingly by public discomfort with the national security implications of 
the presence of a large number of unauthorized persons in the United 
States.116 Thus, the question becomes: does this proposal offer other 
institutional design benefits, which would make it attractive to Congress?  
The purpose of this section is to highlight such benefits.  
In conditions of informational asymmetry, governments often seek to 
identify private parties who have better access to information, to aid in their 
gate-keeping and enforcement functions.117 Given the weak institutional 
                                                           
114  It bears emphasizing that the issue is not one of legal permissibility; indeed, 
the INA includes a dizzying array of bases for excluding aliens from the U.S., which 
have been routinely upheld by the courts even when they bear no clear relation to 
immigration policy goals.  See LEGOMSKY AND RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14 at 514-
520, 544- 589.  
115  Introduction to ZOLBERG,  supra note 16.  
116  Id. Indeed, a recent report by the Pew Research Center for the People & the 
Press confirms that a majority of Americans want tougher enforcement of 
immigration laws and a tough road to citizenship for those undocumented 
immigrants already in the country. See Scott Keeter, Where the Public Stands on 
Immigration Reform, Pew Research Center (Nov. 23, 2009) available at 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1421/where-the-public-stands-on-immigration-reform.   
117  See, e.g., Manns, supra note 15, at 889 (The desirability of private 
gatekeepers turns on the fact that the goods or services they supply or demand 
provide them with cost-effective opportunities to detect and potentially prevent 
wrongdoing by customers or suppliers. For example, lawyers and accountants may 
be well-positioned to detect fraud by their clients . . .  at significantly lower 
economic and social costs than public enforcers. Enlisting these types of private 
actors as public monitors of narrowly defined areas of wrongdoing may provide 
governments with cost-effective ways to outsource enforcement functions . . . ). 
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framework and pervasive informality in many developing countries, the 
challenges of enlisting uncoordinated private actors as gate-keepers and 
enforcers may seem especially daunting. However, there are several features 
of financial intermediaries that make them appropriate candidates. 
  
 
1. The Key Features of Financial Intermediaries to the Poor 
Financial intermediaries know their clients well and play critical roles in 
their daily lives.118 Indeed, a detailed ethnographic study of the spending 
habits of the poor in Bangladesh, India, and South Africa found that a 
majority of respondents interacted with informal financial intermediaries 
very regularly. Researchers find a dizzying range of financial intermediaries 
servicing the poor including deposit takers, money-lenders, savings clubs, 
and rotating savings and credit associations. In the absence of reliable 
financial record-keeping, informal financial intermediaries in developing 
countries must visit their clients on a nearly daily basis to ascertain their 
assets and liabilities.  Indeed, they know their clients so well that they give 
new meaning to the term “community banker.” 
By leveraging their extensive access to on-the ground information, 
informal money-lenders appear to have developed an expertise in pricing risk 
in conditions of informality.  Moreover, they appear to be well-hedged 
against down-side risk: through their extensive networks, they are able to 
locate defaulters and collect outstanding amounts. Indeed, they are 
paradigmatic hostage takers: even if borrowers disappear, money-lenders 
have access to relatives, against whom they may make implicit and explicit 
threats.   
As formal financial intermediaries have recognized the size of the 
potential client base at the bottom of the pyramid, they too are increasingly 
stepping into the lending market for the poor.119  Moreover, they appear to be 
                                                           
118             DARYL COLLINS et Al., PORTFOLIOS OF THE POOR: HOW THE WORLD’S 
POOR LIVE ON $2 A DAY (2009). 
119  Providing financial intermediation in the formal lending sector will 
potentially have spillover effects.  Moneylenders may provide credit, but they rarely 
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replicating the strategies of their informal competitors.  For example, rather 
than setting up formal branches, they too provide home-based banking.  
Moreover, recognizing the expertise of informal lenders in pricing local 
risks, when formal financial institutions seek to increase their market share, 
they often hire persons who were previously providers of informal financial 
services.  These persons typically are from local communities and have pre-
existing knowledge of potential clients.  
Finally, as developing countries have modified their regulatory 
frameworks to create incentives for formal financial intermediaries to service 
the poor, in many countries, the market at the bottom of the pyramid is 
becoming increasingly competitive.120  As barriers to entry fall and 
competition for making loans increases, lenders’ business reputations matter 
for recruiting potential clients.  The preliminary evidence is that interest rates 
have fallen, customer service has improved, and unscrupulous practices have 
declined.121  
2. Financial Intermediaries as Gate-keepers and Policing the Gate-
keepers 
The foregoing speaks to several key features of financial intermediaries 
that make them appropriate gatekeepers.122  Recall that the information 
                                                                                                                                            
offer a gateway to other asset-building services, such as insurance, annuities, and so 
forth. As one banker pointed out in his interview, informal money-lenders are not in 
a position to execute contracts with re-insurers! Indeed, studies of the clients of the 
most famous micro-credit institution, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, have 
confirmed that once the poor begin to access credit, they simultaneously gain access 
to health, agricultural and funeral insurance, and retirement accounts, among other 
services that have heretofore been unattainable. Introduction to DE AGHION, supra 
note 91. 
120           We have seen more significant forays into extending formal financial 
services to the poor in markets where the bottom of the pyramid is so large that the 
size of the market serves to mitigate the misgivings of financial institutions about 
servicing this segment of the population. These include markets such as India and 
Brazil (as opposed to much smaller markets such as Jamaica).  Introduction to C.K. 
PRAHALAD, supra note 32.  
121 JAMES R. BARTH et al., RETHINKING BANK REGULATION: TILL ANGELS 
GOVERN (2005).  
122  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The 
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308-09 (2004) 
(defining gatekeepers as "reputational intermediary(ies)"); Assaf Hamdani, 
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needed to assess trustworthiness of a potential migrant is hyper-local; it is 
difficult to access or evaluate ex-ante predictors of reliability on a non-local 
level.   Notably, screening and monitoring already are core competencies of 
lenders; they must perform this service well to stay in business.  In the 
conditions of informality that are pervasive in the countries from which poor 
migrants typically originate, banks who now service the poor are only able to 
stay in business if they force the convergence of the formal and the informal.  
They typically draw on a range of informal networks on the ground to 
closely scrutinize potential clients.  These are precisely the hyper-local 
networks that the U.S. typically has not been able to penetrate to gather 
information on visa applicants. Thus, these banks constitute ideal 
“gatekeepers.” 
Second, formal lenders are providing indispensable (or near-
indispensable) services.  They play a critical income-smoothing function, 
allowing the poor to transform irregular income streams into smoother 
resource flows.   
As formal financial intermediation becomes more standard in poor 
communities, bankers will become less difficult to replace, particularly if 
they crowd out their informal competitors through good service and 
competitive pricing.  Third, as formal players, reputational integrity should 
be important to their businesses.  Theoretically, if they operate within a 
regulatory structure, they receive minimal (or negative) payoff for breaking 
the law.  In this sense, they are essentially reputational intermediaries. 
If the banks become the gatekeepers, who will police the gatekeepers?  
The potential “rent-seeking” problems are apparent in that without external 
oversight, loan officers will have powerful incentives to choose from among 
a group of qualified applicants those who are willing to offer bribes.  A loan 
officer still may be able to keep the loan default rate of her clients low, thus 
assuring that she will retain her position and earn some extra income in the 
                                                                                                                                            
Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 63 (2003) (defining gatekeepers as 
parties who "offer a service . . .  that is necessary . . .  to . . . engage in certain 
activities"); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to 
Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1050-54 
(1993) (noting that gatekeepers often provide “indispensable” services); Reinier H. 
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (noting that gatekeepers "are able to disrupt misconduct by 
withholding their cooperation").  
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process.  So, she might figure, why not take a bribe?   Indeed, there is 
evidence of extensive rent-seeking among loan programs for the rural poor in 
developing countries, particularly when the loans are backed by government-
guarantees.123 Thus, the foregoing proposal is contingent on the existence of 
a robust regulatory system in which banks are overseen by some external 
entity, a situation that does not currently pertain in many developing 
countries from which guest workers typically originate.124  
For obvious reasons, it is difficult for the U.S. to influence rule-making 
and enforcement on the ground in a developing country. There is a larger 
potential benefit that perhaps dwarfs the others from a developmental 
perspective.  The United States may seek to instigate a “race to the top,” 
encouraging the institutionalization of regulatory best practices in developing 
countries, by insisting that it will only accept bonds underwritten by lenders 
who operate in countries that meet certain standards of regulation. 
The U.S. should also insist that banks achieve certain levels of 
effectiveness in their screening processes. Consider the following: If a guest 
worker overstays but continues to service the loan, then what incentive does 
the bank have to get the worker to leave the U.S.?  An illegal immigrant 
might just pay off the loan, essentially to “buy off” the bank. In the worst 
case scenario, one might envision certain banks whose clients have such high 
rates of visa-overstay that the banks essentially become facilitators of 
undocumented migration.  To avoid this problem, the U.S. government must 
penalize banks that lend to too many visa violators by refusing to accept their 
bonds.125 
                                                           
123  Richard L. Meyer & Geetha Nagarajan, Rural Finance: Recent Advances 
and Emerging, Lessons, Debates, and Opportunities 76 (Department of Agricultural, 
Environmental, and Development Economics, Working Paper No. AEDE-WP-0041-
05, 2005). 
124  Banking and the State, The World Bank: Crisis Talk: Emerging Markets 
and the Financial Crisis, 
http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d834515e9269e2010536e7386497
0b (last visited Jan. 18, 2010). Some economists have argued that regulating 
financial disclosure requirements is the most effective contributor to banking 
development and protecting poor savers and borrowers in particular. See BARTH ET 
AL, supra note 156. 
125  Of course it takes “two to tango” and the U.S. should also tweak its own 
policies to discourage visa overstay, even as it attempts to influence bank policies.  
For example, this proposal will work best if those who abide by the terms of their 
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The bottom line: in a context in which banks cannot count on rules, they 
make deals with individual borrowers.126 By borrowing against a U.S. visa, 
migrants will be in essence signing unto a U.S.-influenced “loan default 
equals visa default” rule in the local market. If borrowers service their loans 
within this rule-bound framework, banks will have positive institutional 
experience with poor borrowers, allowing them to create actuarial tables 
calculating risks, and thereby encouraging the growth of a market, in visa-as-
collateral lending. Additionally, local regulators will have an incentive to 
tighten their rules and banks will abide by the local regulatory framework if 
the U.S. insists that these are conditions of local banks participating in the 
program.  Thus, the visa-as-collateral proposal may help to accelerate a 
developing nation’s transition (even interstitially) from an inefficient, deal-
based, opaque system of lending to a more efficient, rule-based, transparent 
system of lending to the poor.127   
B. The Enforcement Question 
1. Migration’s Network Nature and the Difficulty of Enforcement 
A central tenet of the economic sociology of immigration is that 
migration is sustained by a dense web of interlocking ethnic networks that 
operate trans-nationally. Studies have demonstrated that the key factor in 
sustaining undocumented migration is the presence of thick cross-border 
ethnic networks that facilitate migration, and enable the integration of 
                                                                                                                                            
visa have some reasonable prospect of visa-renewal once they return to their home 
countries.  Visa-renewal will essentially become a “reward” for good behavior 
(along with the U.S. returning the bond), and provide a further disincentive for guest 
workers to disappear into the underground economy. Indeed, several European 
Union countries have committed to renewing the visas of low-skilled workers who 
return home for precisely this reason.  See, Patrick Weil, All or Nothing? What the 
United States Can Learn from Europe as it contemplates Circular Migration and 
Legalization for Undocumented Immigrants (2010) at 
http://database.gmfus.org/rs/ct.aspx?ct=24F76C1FD6E40AEDC1D180ACD22F921
ADCBE5588F8A52DA2349D55444994EE21FC480CCED0D813CA335D773AA9
5658FE9FEA874847170E4EFF895E528EA32B9BC0599DFB0600D5A3404D2763
34C62FA51D8F2756E6638A3D1257F04 (German Marshall Fund, last visited July 
10, 2010). 
126 Hallward-Dreimer et. al., supra, note 37.  
127 Indeed, there is evidence that the Grameen model has had precisely this 
effect in Bangladesh. DE AGHION et al., supra note 91.  
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migrants even when they lack documentation.128  Unsurprisingly, these same 
transnational networks facilitate the incorporation of persons who previously 
have been documented. When persons become undocumented, these 
networks provide false documentation and facilitate their placement into 
jobs.  Thus, migrants are generally incorporated into economic and social 
networks with relative ease and minimal costs, irrespective of their legal 
status. 129  Notably, all of these networks are quintessentially private. Even 
when public officials charged with enforcement have informal ties to these 
networks, they generally are unable to penetrate them to enforce immigration 
laws.130 Moreover, even when they are successful in penetrating these 
networks and conduct raids in the communities, they generally incur 
extraordinary social and economic costs.131   
For example, although polling data shows that a majority of Americans 
express concern about ineffective immigration enforcement in the abstract, 
when enforcement actually occurs, it is often controversial.  Public enforcers 
find that they incur the wrath not only of the targets of the raid, but also of a 
                                                           
128 PORTES supra note 58, at 22.  The landmark work in this regard has been 
conducted by Douglas Massey at the Office of Population Research at Princeton 
University, who has analyzed Mexican migratory patterns over the last century.  See 
Michael B. Aguilera & Douglas S. Massey, Social Capital and the Wages of 
Mexican Migrants: New Hypotheses and Tests 82 Social Forces 671 (2003). 
Important supplementary work has been done as well. See, e.g., DAVID KYLE, 
TRANSNATIONAL PEASANTS: MIGRATIONS, NETWORKS, AND ETHNICITY IN ANDEAN 
ECUADOR, (2000) (same point made in relation to Ecuadorian migration); CECILIA 
MENJIVAR, FRAGMENTED TIES: SALVADORAN IMMIGRATION NETWORKS IN 
AMERICA, (2000) (same point made in relation to Salvadorian migration);  Nestor P. 
Rodriguez & Jaqueline Maria Hagan, Maya Urban Villagers in Houston: the 
Formation of a Migrant Community from San Cristobal Totonicapan, 197-210 in 
JAMES LOUCKY & MARILYN MOORS (eds.), THE MAYA DIASPORA: GUATEMALAN 
ROOTS, NEW AMERICAN LIVES (2000) (same  point made in relation to Guatemalan 
migration). 
129 PORTES supra note 58, at 22. 
130  Manns, supra note 15. 
131  Robert Hildreth, ICE Immigration Raids Waste Time and Money, New 
American Media, Dec. 26, 2008, at 
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article. 
html?article_id=3823e62e972ef6fec715fe8298a3045e; See also Blog, “Stop the 
Raids,” N.Y. TIMES, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/0pinion/04thur2.html (Oct. 7, 2007).  
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range of religious, business and non-governmental actors.132 In summary, 
such immigration raids increase levels of distrust within communities and 
undermine “communal efficacy,” as persons who have historically played 
critical roles in families and the broader community are displaced.133 
Essentially, a consensus seems to be emerging that forced deportation as a 
cure may be worse than the disease.134 Through encouraging self-
deportation, visa-as-collateral may provide a better alternative. 
2. Financial Intermediaries May Be Motivated to Find Non-Compliant 
Aliens 
This section discusses further institutional innovations that would better 
enable banks to extract penalties when aliens default on their bonds and thus, 
increase the likelihood that non-compliant aliens will be excluded with 
minimal involvement from public enforcers.  The key feature of a visa-
bonding system is that the bond will be forfeited if the alien becomes non-
compliant with the conditions of the visa.  Indeed, in Singapore where 
bonding systems are also regularly utilized, once the alien becomes non-
compliant, the bond is generally forfeited in its entirety.135 In contrast to this 
                                                           
132  See Monica Rhor, Impact: Immigration Raids Split Families, Boston Globe 
at A 9 (Mar. 11, 2007) (raids spur church opposition); Nina Bernstein, Church 
Works with U.S. to Spare Detention, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2009, at A1 (same); See 
Julia Preston, Employers Fight Tough Measures on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Page 
cite) (July 6, 2008) (finding that local businesses are banding together to voice their 
concerns regarding the negative implications of stringent immigration enforcement 
for business). See also Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE at 36 (July 9, 2006) (pointing out that local businesses benefit from the 
consumption of products and services by undocumented migrants. Conversely, these 
firms lose business when undocumented migrants leave).  
133  See Rhor, supra note 132, at 54. 
134  See Preston, supra note 132; Lowenstein supra note 132. See also Steve 
Dinnen, How an Immigration Raid Changed a Town: Tiny Postville, Iowa, Struggles 
to Regain its Footing One Year After the Largest Immigration Sweep in US History, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 5, 2009 at 9.  
135  See Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland, Circular 
Migration and Development: Trends, Policy Routes, and Ways Forward, (Migration 
Pol. Inst.), Apr. 2007, available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MigDevPB_041807.pdf; see also ORN 
BODVARRSON and HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG, TEMPORARY MIGRATION 
INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION AND OTHER VARIATIONS ON THE STANDARD MODEL 261-
84 (2009).  
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approach, the proposal herein advocates a system of “staged” or “tiered” 
forfeiture.  
The first institutional design innovation is that even if an alien is non-
compliant with the visa’s conditions, the bank should be able to recoup a 
significant proportion of the bond upon providing evidence that the alien in 
fact has left the United States.  It is critical that the window of opportunity to 
recoup the bond should be limited.  A network theory of immigration tells us 
that undocumented aliens become enmeshed more thoroughly in social 
networks if they are out of status for long periods and thus become more 
difficult to find, so it is crucial that banks find them quickly.136  
Thus, the second novel feature of this proposal is that the “tiering” of 
bond forfeiture should be indexed to the speed with which the bank is able to 
provide evidence that the alien has left the U.S. That is, the proportion of the 
bond that the bank can recoup could be tied to the speed of self-deportation.  
One approach would be to legalize a bail bondsman status for banking 
companies. 137  Of course, bail bondsmen are already widely utilized in the 
criminal law context; they have significant powers to apprehend individuals 
who violate the terms of their bond and flee the authorities. 138  This 
approach would undoubtedly be controversial. Indeed, enlisting the support 
of the immigration bar in institutionalizing such a bail-bondsman proposal 
would be dependent on the successful importation of protections that have 
                                                           
136  PORTES, supra note 56.  
137  The analogies to the current system of bail-bondsmen in the criminal 
justice system are evident. For a good summary of the bail bondsmen system see, 
Section 7.III.C at 936 in STEPHEN SALTZBURG AND DANIEL CAPRA, AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2007).   
138   Id. Indeed, institutional design innovations to mitigate the possibility of 
abuses by bail-bondsmen may also be appropriate in this context. See Behind the 
Bail Bond System, All Things Considered, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122954677 for a discussion of 
charges of abuses by bail bondsmen. The American Bar Association has standards 
concerning pre-trial release that includes institutional innovations to aid in the 
regulation of bail-bondsmen.  See Section 5.4, ABA Standards on Pretrial Release 
available at www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pretrialrelease_toc.html. The 
Uniform Bail Bond Act also regulates the practices of bondsmen. However, it has 
only been adopted in some states.  See the Summary of Uniform Bail Bond Act, 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners available at 
www.naic.org/.../committees_ex_pltf_plwg_uniformity_stds_wclar.pdf.  
56 
been developed for defendants in the criminal law context into the 
immigration context. 139 As applied in the immigration context, bankers (and 
their agents) would be given the right to apprehend visa overstayers and turn 
them over to the authorities.  The key advantage bankers may have is the 
ability to engage in superior information gathering.  This incentive to 
apprehend visa-overstayers would be especially powerful if the government 
returned to the bank some percentage of the bond that would otherwise be 
forfeited, in the event that the bank can successfully apprehend the visa 
overstayer.    
3.  Mitigating the risks of “snitching” 
imate enforcement function by 
encouraging the wrong-doers to self-deport.   
that is, the web of social relationships that sustain its coherence.142  Thus, the 
Banks will typically be better than the government at accessing 
hyper-local information on non-compliant aliens, irrespective of the 
mechanism of enforcement. But there is an additional advantage of the 
proposed system in that the bank’s enforcement function differs in a critical 
way from the classic gatekeeper function.  Typically, in the event of 
wrongdoing, gatekeepers provide evidence that allows the government to 
fulfill the ultimate enforcement function.  In so doing, “snitching” is a 
quintessential gatekeeper role.  However, in this instance, rather than 
“snitching,” the gatekeeper may fulfill the ult
While snitches (or private informants) are utilized regularly to supplement 
public enforcement, snitching may have negative spillover effects, 
particularly in poor urban communities where migrants are 
disproportionately likely to reside. 140 In the criminal justice context snitching 
may augment distrust of law enforcement officials.141  This is likely to be 
true in the immigration context also, since persons are unlikely to distinguish 
between immigration enforcement officials and law enforcement more 
generally.  Moreover, snitching may undermine interpersonal relationships in 
communities and generally threaten the social organization of a community, 
                                                           
139  SALTZBURG AND CAPRA, supra note 137, at 936. 
140  Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: the Institutional and Communal 
3 U. CINN. L. REV. 645, 650 (2005). Consequences, 7
141  Id. 
142  The playwright Arthur Miler recognized this risk decades ago.  These risks 
are discussed in John Lahr's review of Arthur Miller's seminal play.  See John Lahr, 
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ideal scenario would be for gatekeepers to accomplish the enforcement 
function without snitching. 
 
PART IV.  THE COMMODIFICATION CRITIQUE 
 A.    Background: Levmore’s puzzle  
Consider two migrants who represent opposite loci on the 
immigration continuum. “Sanjay,” a Harvard-trained Indian national is a 
wealthy Google shareholder.143 He obtained his visa through a highly 
competitive process partly on the basis of a commitment to make a job-
generating business investment in the U.S.144 His visa may be revocable if he 
does not meet these conditions.145 A second immigrant, “Ambrosio” is a 
Guatemalan construction worker who also makes a financial investment to 
gain U.S. labor market access.146 He pools his family’s meager resources to 
make a down-payment to a coyote.147 Not only does the coyote arrange 
Ambrosio’s clandestine cross-border travel, he also serves as an informal 
banker, providing a “loan” to fund transportation costs (at least in the form of 
deferred payment arrangements).148  
Given a worldwide population of persons with resources who are 
willing to pay for access to the United States labor market, the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) embodies the sentiment that it is appropriate to 
extract value (either in skills or capital) from those who seek visas.149 Having 
                                                                                                                                            
lent Crime: A 
 
 Clashes with Immigration Rules, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 2009, at B1. 
 Miriam Jordan, Latest Immigration 
ALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008 at A1. 
A View from the Bridge, NEW YORKER, Feb. 1, 2010.  See also Sampson, Robert J., 
Stephen Raudenbush, and Felton Earls.  Neighborhoods and Vio
Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, SCIENCE 277:918-24 (1997). 
143 The “Sanjay” example is taken from Matt Richtel, Remade in America:
Tech Recruiting
144  Id. 
145  Id.  
146  The “Ambrosio” example is taken from
Wave: Retreat, W
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  See 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(5) (1994) (providing for visas to be issued to 
immigrants who invest at least one million dollars in a start-up business that 
generates full-time jobs for ten United States citizens or lawful residents.); 
§1153(b)(1)(A)-(B) (providing for visas to be issued to immigrants of "extraordinary 
ability" or who are "outstanding" with a significant likelihood of making innovative 
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incurred significant financial costs, the prospective migrant agrees to abide 
by certain rules and incurs the risk of visa revocation if she does not meet her 
commitments.  The prospective migrant also may face a financial penalty in 
the form of costs that she cannot recoup.   
Herein lies the bifurcation in treatment that is illustrative of an 
uneasy consensus.150 Migrants are regularly allowed to “put their money 
where their mouth is” at the top of the pyramid: Sanjay is a prototype of such 
elite access.  Contrast this situation with that of Ambrosio, a prototypical 
immigrant at the bottom of the pyramid; given the astronomical expenses 
Ambrosio incurs to cross the border,151 it is reasonable to assume that he, 
too, would be willing to pay to gain access to a temporary guest worker visa, 
the only visa category to which he is likely to have legal access given his low 
skill base. However, there is no such option available to him.  
Saul Levmore has characterized as a “puzzle” the general 
disinclination of political elites when they are already resorting to the market 
to allocate visas (as in the case of Sanjay), to simultaneously finance 
purchases (for the Ambrosios of the world) to expand demand.152 Levmore 
theorized that terms easily could be reached which could satisfy both the 
expansionist instincts of those who support more open borders and the 
restrictionist instincts of those who fear the economic, social and cultural 
implications of long-term commitments to new migrants.  
This article’s advocacy of a visa bonding system coupled with a re-
conceptualization of a visa-as-collateral may be viewed as one attempt to 
map out such terms.  By raising the costs of non-compliance and lowering 
over-stay rates, bonding systems may expand U.S. labor market access, 
particularly for poor migrants.  Thus, it addresses the concerns of the 
expansionists by making it possible for more persons to enter, albeit 
temporarily.  It simultaneously addresses the concerns of restrictionists, 
                                                                                                                                            
contributions to the American economy); and §1153(b)(2) (providing for visas to be 
issued to immigrants with advanced academic training or who possess "exceptional 
ability"). 
150  My thanks to Douglas Massey for highlighting to me the bifurcation in 
treatment of the Sanjay’s and Ambrosio’s of the world. 
151 See Jordan, supra note 180.  
152  Saul Levmore, Unconditional Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REV. 807, 812-14 
(1996). 
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given its emphasis on visa compliance so as to preclude short-term guests 
becoming long-term residents.   
 B.    Commodification Critiques 
I end with a brief reflection on one deeply-held potential source of 
discomfort with “visa-as-collateral,” namely the “commodification concern.”  
Indeed, this provides a primary rationale for the persistence and vexing 
nature of Levmore’s puzzle. 
“Visa-as-collateral” reasonably might be grouped with a range of 
proposals that fall under the umbrella of “market-based” approaches to 
immigration.  Market-based approaches share in common a critical approach 
to the traditional view of the government as the best arbiter of who should 
receive a visa.  Rather, they assert, access to first world labor markets should 
be available to those applicants who, having met certain eligibility 
requirements, are willing to pay a market-based price.  
These “market-based” approaches have been subject to a range of 
critiques that broadly fall under the anti-commodification heading.  
Commodification criticisms usually are based on the moral intuition that a 
monetary value should not be attached to membership in the body politic that 
is conferred to citizens.153  The same moral intuition extends to affiliation 
with the body politic as a visa-recipient, since even temporary affiliation 
with the body politic carries certain rights and responsibilities.154 Moreover, 
since many citizens originally were temporary visa recipients, temporary 
visas often signify a special affiliation with the polity and, in many cases, the 
first step on a path to citizenship.  
                                                           
153  Michael Sandel is a prominent proponent of this view. See Michael Sandel, 
What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, Brasenose College, Oxford, 1998. See also Margaret Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1870-87 (1987) (critiquing the sale of 
citizenship);  MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, (1996) (same); AYELET 
SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 54-58 
(2009) (same).  
154  See Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case For Open Borders, 49 
NOTRE DAME REV. OF POL. 251, 251-73 (1987). For an opposing view see MICHAEL 
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31-63 
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These commodification critiques rely heavily on traditional accounts 
of political membership or affiliation, which typically treat citizenship, and 
even lesser affiliations with the polity as a visa-recipient, as a bundle of 
rights -- a source of identity or an inalienable legal status.  Given these 
background philosophical underpinnings, it is not surprising that market-
based mechanisms of allocation of either citizenship or visas are anathema to 
anti-commodificationists.  The primary purpose of this section is to address 
the commodification critique.  
 
 
C.     Visa-as-Collateral Differs in Critical Ways from Traditional 
Market-Based Proposals 
Traditional market-based approaches to immigration share an 
emphasis on allocating visas to the aliens who would benefit most from visas 
and to the aliens who would be most highly valued by Americans. The logic 
of selling citizenship represents the functioning of a global market for a 
particular factor of production, that is, human capital, which will gravitate to 
places where its contribution is greatest. Some economists advocate selling 
citizenship as a rationing mechanism in which the entry price would be set to 
maximize aggregate income for the native population.155 Others advocate an 
auction to the highest bidders, while some economists would limit the 
auction to pre-qualified applicants.156  Still others advocate proposals 
combining traditional and market-based approaches, whereby admission is 
granted to some, utilizing traditional criteria (i.e., according to 
qualifications), and to others according to their willingness to pay.157   
There is a critical distinction between visa-as-collateral and these 
market-based approaches.  Visa-as-collateral advocates a “soft” utilization of 
market approaches to accomplish entirely different goals.  The point of this 
proposal is not to allocate visas to the highest value users (although this 
might be a side-effect of the policy). Rather, the purpose is facilitative, 
                                                           
155  JULIAN SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION (1989). 
156  Gary S. Becker, An Open Door for Immigrants -- the Auction, Wall St. J., 
Oct. 14, 1992 at A14.  
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namely, to accomplish the important goal of mitigating information 
asymmetry challenges regardless of the potential migrant’s skills or ability to 
pay the highest price for a visa.   
Yet irrespective of one’s beliefs regarding the goals of immigration 
law, 158 it is generally agreed that current methods of U.S. visa allocation fail 
to accomplish goals that are fundamental to any successful immigration 
policy. That is, having identified first order policy goals (such as recruiting 
skilled persons or meeting labor-market shortages for low-skilled persons) 
the current system does not appropriately meet these first order policy goals.   
Although this proposal does not advocate the allocation of visas to 
the highest value users, I recognize that my position implicates many of the 
underlying sentiments against commodification. Anti-commodification 
critics undoubtedly would argue that this proposal would disadvantage those 
who are knowledge-poor, network-poor or cash-poor. These persons are 
disproportionately likely to be at the bottom of the pyramid. 
 
D. The Official, Public and Academic Postures: Non-
Commodification 
With rare exceptions, the official posture of the U.S. government is 
one of non-commodification in immigration.  This is evidenced, in part, by 
the public pronouncements of immigration policy-makers, and explains why, 
despite empirical evidence from other countries of the potential benefits of 
auction systems,159 both primary and secondary markets for visas have 
received very little traction in U.S. policy-making circles.  Indeed, even in 
the current global economic crisis, in which other countries have auctioned 
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visas to investors as a mechanism of jump-starting declining sectors of their 
economies, the United States has remained resistant to such an approach.160    
This official posture of non-commodification coincides with polling 
data on this issue, which show that a majority of Americans oppose 
proposals to auction visas.  The rationales offered by the polling data mirror 
the anti-commodification rationales in the academic literature: visas, to the 
extent that they signify potential access to citizenship, are understood by 
Americans to be quintessentially public assets,161 in part because even if 
visas only allow temporary affiliation, many applicants overstay and later 
receive amnesties that permit them to become citizens.  Thus, the receipt of a 
visa often signifies the first stage on a path to citizenship, and for this reason, 
selling visas often is equated with selling access to a quintessentially public 
asset. Indeed, visas might even be referred to as “public goods,” although 
this is clearly an unconventional utilization of the term.  
Analysts who have studied polling data suggest that the public’s resistance to 
commoditizing visas arises in part from what students of cultural cognition 
and behavioral economics have called a “framing problem.”162 Thus, even 
when confronted with evidence demonstrating the potential value of auctions 
in resolving immigration dilemmas, social-psychological processes lead 
individuals to assimilate evidence in a manner that is consistent with pre-
existing cultural frames that are dominant in the political marketplace.163 
These cultural frames are hostile to a market-based approach in the context 
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of immigration and thus the average American voter appears unlikely to be 
comfortable with the notion of utilizing the market as a primary method of 
visa allocation.164  
                 E.    Tragic Choice Framework  
Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that a primary challenge in society is “to 
make allocations in ways that preserve the moral foundations of social 
collaboration.” 165  Their book is entitled “Tragic Choices,” to capture the 
idea that choices regarding the allocation of scarce goods inevitably will 
breach some deeply-held societal values.  They draw a distinction between 
first-order and second-order allocation decisions, with the former relating to 
how much of a scarce good will ultimately be produced, and the latter 
relating to who will get the goods.  
They argue that societies generally keep these decisions separate, 
with each level of decision-making preserving a different mix of values.  We 
keep the levels separate so as to preserve the illusion that none of society’s 
values have been disregarded.  This shifting trajectory of decision-making is 
characterized as a series of “subterfuges” 166 intended to shield the 
allocational decision-making, or “tragic choices,” from public view.  A legal 
subterfuge is a device that accomplishes a desirable end while masking the 
methodology that produced the end.  Subterfuges are “useful – if dangerous – 
lie(s)” that we use to cope with “tragic choices.”167  
There is clearly an analogy in the immigration arena to this modus-
operandi: while the official U.S. posture is one of non-commodification, both 
current and historical policy reflects concessions to commodification in 
significant ways.  One scholar argues that even a cursory view of U.S. 
immigration history supports the view that persons have traditionally “paid” 
very high prices to obtain the right to enter the U.S.168 For example, as noted 
in the “Sanjay” example above, under current U.S. immigration law, persons 
seeking to obtain legal permanent residency under certain sections of the 
INA may be obligated to invest at least one million dollars and employ at 
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least ten U.S. residents, and their status may be revoked if they do not meet 
these commitments.169 Moreover, there are also concessions to 
commodification at the margins.  One might call these “unofficial 
subterfuges,” as a cottage industry has developed with brokers and coyotes 
charging applicants high fees to gain entry to the United States.  Notably, 
these fees are pervasive, not only in the underground markets, but also in the 
formal markets, since elite applicants typically employ attorneys who charge 
high fees to navigate the complexities of the INA.  Recent investigative 
reporting has uncovered instances of aliens employing lobbyists to intercede 
on their behalf with Congressional staff, who in turn, intercede on their 
behalf with the immigration authorities.   
However, since the government is not the beneficiary of these fees 
charged, we are more concerned with “official subterfuges.”  Concerns about 
“selling” visa access are surmountable when dealing with candidates like 
“Sanjay” above, who constitute a tiny pool of very privileged applicants 
operating above-board in a transparent marketplace.  However, we become 
much more concerned about the sale of visa access as we approach the 
bottom of the pyramid -- when considered in the context of the acute poverty 
of visa applicants from the third world, selling visas too obviously 
contradicts anti-commodification values held by many Americans.  
CONCLUSION: IF WE ARE GOING TO COMMODIFY, WE CANNOT 
EXCLUDE THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID 
Precisely because we already use bond-like mechanisms to screen 
rich and highly-skilled migrants by requiring them to pay attorneys and make 
minimum investments in the U.S., the onus is to explain why we would forgo 
similar opportunities with respect to poor migrants.  The bonding proposal 
made herein may expose the subterfuges170 that necessarily accompany the 
tragic choices that we make in immigration, the burdens of which 
disproportionately fall on the poor. This proposal accomplishes immigration 
law goals in a manner that reduces subterfuges and renders the choices made 
somewhat less tragic, particularly for the poor. 
Visa-as-collateral embodies the classic challenges of proposals that 
seek to meet liberalism’s commitment to improve the lot of the least 
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advantaged, while simultaneously meeting important consequentialist goals.  
Aspects of the proposal may seem unattractive to those with liberal 
commitments who are skeptical of initiatives which appear to increase 
burdens on aliens, particularly those at the bottom of the pyramid.  Yet, as a 
practical matter, by reducing the likelihood and cost of visa-breaches, this 
proposal improves the likelihood of access for those at the bottom of the 
pyramid.  If the world’s poorest have improved access to credit and to U.S. 
labor markets, there are clear positive economic implications, not only for 
migrants, but also for source-labor communities and countries.  Thus, to the 
extent that there is a trade-off between ethical commitments and 
consequentialist goals, the trade-off is a worthy one.   
 
 
